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What the Constitution Means  
by “Duties, Imposts, and  
Excises”—and “Taxes”  
(Direct or Otherwise) 
Robert G. Natelson† 
“Mr King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? 
No one answd.” 
    —Madison’s Constitutional Convention notes 
“The objects of direct taxes are well understood . . .” 
    —Future Chief Justice John Marshall at the  
       Virginia Ratifying Convention 
Abstract 
This Article recreates the original definitions of the U.S. Consti-
tution’s terms “tax,” “direct tax,” “duty,” “impost,” “excise,” and 
“tonnage.” It draws on a greater range of Founding-Era sources than 
accessed heretofore, including eighteenth-century treatises, tax statutes, 
and literary sources, and it corrects several errors made by courts and 
previous commentators. It concludes that the distinction between direct 
and indirect taxes was widely understood during the Founding Era and 
that the term “direct tax” was more expansive than commonly realized. 
The Article identifies the reasons the Constitution required that 
direct taxes be apportioned among the states by population. It con-
cludes that the Constitution’s “three-fifths” formula was a response to 
certain economic facts about slavery but that the underlying decision 
to apportion had little or nothing to do with slavery. 
Finally, the Article reviews the Supreme Court’s holding that the 
Affordable Care Act’s penalty for not acquiring insurance is a tax but 
not a direct tax and concludes that if the penalty was a tax, it was 
direct. 
 
†  Robert G. Natelson, Professor of Law, The University of Montana (ret.), 
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Necessary and Proper Clause (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010). His CV and 
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David Kopel, Research Director of the Independence Institute for his 
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1. Bibliographical Note: This footnote collects sources cited more than once, 
including some prior work by the author. 
 Founding-Era Legislative and Governmental Publications 
 British: William Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of 
England (1815–16); Journal of the House of Commons [hereinafter 
H.C. Jour.]; The Parliamentary Register; or History of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons [hereinafter 
Parliamentary Register] (mult. vols.). 
 Federal: Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789 
(Government Printing Office 1904–37) [hereinafter J. Cont’l Cong.]. 
 Connecticut: 1–5 The Public Records of the State of Connecticut 
(Charles J. Hoadly & Leonard Woods Labaree eds., 1894–1943) 
[hereinafter Conn. Records]. 
 Massachusetts: The Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, 1777–87 (1890–1918) [hereinafter Mass. Resolves]. 
 New Hampshire: Early State Papers of New Hampshire (Albert 
Stillman Batchellor ed., 1891–92) [hereinafter N.H. Papers]. 
 New York: Laws of the State of New York (1798) [hereinafter N.Y. 
Laws], available at the Gale Database, Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 
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 Pennsylvania: Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of 
Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Theo. Fenn & Co. 1853) [hereinafter Min. 
Pa. Ex. Council]. 
 South Carolina: The Public Laws of the State of South Carolina 
(Phila., R. Aitken & Son 1790) [hereinafter S.C. Laws]. 
 Virginia: Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia [hereinafter Va. H.D. Jour.]; Journal of the Senate of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia [hereinafter Va. Sen. Jour.]. 
 Other Founding Era Publications and Collections of Publications 
 Francis Allen, A Complete English Dictionary (London 1765) 
[hereinafter Allen, Dictionary]. 
 John Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English 
Language (London 1775) [hereinafter Ash, Dictionary]. 
 William Blackstone, Commentaries (1765). 
 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution (Merrill Jensen, John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1976–2013) [hereinafter Documentary History]. 
 Encyclopaedia Britannica (2d ed. 1778) [hereinafter Encyclopaedia 
Britannica]. 
 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia, or, an Universal Dictionary of 
Arts and Sciences (London, James & John Knapton et al. 1728). 
 John Dickinson, Letters From A Farmer in Pennsylvania to the 
Inhabitants of the British Colonies (1768). 
 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1937) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records].  
 John Gray, A Plan For Finally Settling the Government of 
Ireland (Dublin 1785). 
 Giles Jacob, Lex Mercatoria: or, the Merchant’s Companion 
(London, Eliz. Nutt & R.Gosling 1718) [hereinafter Jacob, Lex 
Mercatoria]. 
 Giles Jacob & J. Morgan, A New Law-Dictionary (10th ed., 
London 1782) [hereinafter Jacob, Dictionary]. 
 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (8th ed. 
1786) [hereinafter Johnson, Dictionary]. 
 William Perry, The Royal Standard English Dictionary (1st 
Am. ed., Worcester, Mass. 1788) [hereinafter Perry, Dictionary]. 
 Richard Rolt, A New Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (2d 
ed., London 1761) [hereinafter Rolt, Dictionary]. 
 Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English 
Language (3d ed., London 1790) [hereinafter Sheridan, Dictionary]. 
 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (Edwin Cannan ed., London, Methuen & Co. 1904). 
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Introduction 
The Constitution’s Taxation Clause empowers Congress to “lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”2 It also imposes limitations 
on the tax power, including the requirement that “direct Taxes” be 
apportioned among the states.3 To understand the intended scope of 
these powers and limitations—and, therefore, their original legal 
force4—one must understand what the words meant to the people who 
ratified them.  
 Modern Works 
 Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
 Robert A. Becker, Revolution, Reform, and the Politics of 
American Taxation: 1763-1783 (1980). 
 James R. Campbell, Dispelling the Fog About Direct Taxation, 1 Brit. 
J. Am. Legal Stud. 109 (2012). 
 W. F. Dodd, The Effect of the Adoption of the Constitution upon the 
Finances of Virginia, 10 Va. Mag. Hist. & Biography 360 (1903). 
 Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (2006). 
 Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334 (1997). 
 Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing The Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment 
of Direct Tax, 21 Const. Comment. 295 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Fixing]. 
 Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the 
Core of the Constitution, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1 (1998) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Apportionment]. 
 Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary 
Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 415 (2014). 
 Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Origination Clause and Implications 
for the Affordable Care Act, 38 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 629 (2015) 
[hereinafter Natelson, Origination Clause]. 
 Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: 
An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter Natelson, General Welfare]. 
 Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 201 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Indian 
Commerce]. 
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
3. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
4. The Constitution’s original legal force is how courts would have applied 
the document immediately after ratification. The original legal force of a 
constitutional provision is derived from how the ratifiers (not the framers) 
actually understood the provision. If that understanding is not recoverable 
or there were significant inconsistent understandings, original legal force 
is derived from the objective original public meaning of the provision. 
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Although the Constitution’s framers usually employed language in 
its ordinary sense, this was not invariably true. The Constitution 
contains some terms that, when used in legal documents, were widely 
understood to have specialized meanings.5 This Article focuses on six 
technical terms the Constitution uses in defining Congress’s financial 
powers: (1) duties, (2) excises, (3) imposts, (4) tonnage, (5) taxes, and 
(6) direct taxes. In its discussion of direct taxes, this Article also 
explains why the Constitution required them to be apportioned among 
the states. 
I wrote this Article for two reasons. First, the subject has obvious 
modern significance—as the Supreme Court reminded us in its ruling 
on the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.6 Second, previous scholarship addressing it seemed 
inadequate; it is sparse for such an important topic and often is marred 
by methodological defects. The methodological shortcomings are expl-
ained in Part VII. 
Part I of this Article is this Introduction. Part II introduces the 
constitutional text and identifies hints the text offers on the meaning 
of the terms discussed in this Article. Part III explains how the 
Founders distinguished a tax from the broader word imposition. Part 
IV defines the meaning of the controversial phrase direct Tax. Part V 
discusses indirect taxes and defines the four kinds of indirect taxes men-
tioned in the Constitution: duties, excises, imposts, and tonnage. Part 
V further identifies the dividing line between direct and indirect taxes 
and concludes that the line was not fundamentally economic but based 
 
Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1239 (2007). See also 
Natelson, Origination Clause, supra note 1, at 633 (“The original legal 
force of a document or provision in a document is how the courts would 
have applied it immediately following its adoption.”).  
5. Much of my research has been devoted to uncovering the meaning of the 
Constitution’s technical terms. Examples include: (1) the specialized legal 
meaning of “Privileges and Immunities,” Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1117 
(2009); (2) the political meaning of “general Welfare,” Natelson, General 
Welfare, supra note 1; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special 
Interest Spending: the General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of 
the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 239 (2007); and (3) the under-
stood legal meaning of “to regulate Commerce,” Robert G. Natelson & 
David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 
109 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 55 (2010); Robert G. Natelson, 
Tempering the Commerce Power, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 95 (2007); Robert G. 
Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 
St. John’s L. Rev. 789 (2006); Natelson, Indian Commerce, supra note 1. 
6. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012) (holding that a statutory penalty for failure 
to purchase conforming insurance was a “tax” but not a direct tax). 
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on eighteenth century Anglo-American political and moral consider-
ations. 
Part VI explains the reasons behind the apportionment rule. Part 
VII discusses errors occurring in previous writings on the subject, 
including the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sebelius. Part VIII, the 
Conclusion, presents a brief summary of what has gone before. 
This study relies on a very wide range of primary sources. These 
include, besides the records of the Constitution’s drafting and ratif-
ication, eighteenth century treatises, contemporaneous British and 
American tax statutes and other legislative documents, British and 
American newspaper articles, and various other materials. However, for 
reasons that should be obvious, but to many authors apparently are 
not, I rely only on sources arising before the end of 1790, the year Rhode 
Island became the thirteenth state to ratify the Constitution. Later 
material is too weakly probative, or not probative of all, of the ratif-
ication-era understanding.7 
I. Inferences from the Constitutional Text 
The constitutional text offers hints as to the meaning of the terms 
examined in this study. The following discussion addresses that text as 
it stood at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, without the 
changes wrought subsequently by the Sixteenth Amendment8 and by 
court decisions. 
The Constitution imposed two limits on state financial exactions: 
(1) a requirement of congressional consent before a state could “lay any 
Duty of Tonnage”9 and (2) with one exception, a like requirement before 
a state could “lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports.”10 The 
Constitution also authorized Congress to impose financial exactions. 
The Taxation Clause empowered Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises.”11 The Commerce Clause empowered Con-
gress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
 
7. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Constitution: What It 
Actually Said and Meant 36 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the reasons one 
should not rely on post-ratification material as evidence of original legal force). 
8. U.S. Const. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”). 
9. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
10. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
11. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”12 During the founding era, 
commercial regulation was understood to entail financial impositions.13 
The Constitution qualified these grants to Congress. Among the 
qualifications were the following three: 
 “All Bills for raising Revenue” had to originate in the House of 
Representatives;14 
 Congress could impose no “Tax or Duty” on exports;15 and 
 until 1808, Congress was prohibited from levying any “Tax or duty” 
on imported slaves in excess of ten dollars per person.16 
In addition to these qualifications, the Constitution included several 
that reflected the Founders’ belief that government was a fiduciary 
institution, and, to the extent possible, should serve its constituents in 
an impartial manner.17 These were as follows: 
 Taxes, duties, imposts, and excises were to be levied “to pay the 
Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States.”18 The Supreme Court no longer treats this as much of 
a restriction,19 but the Founders understood it to limit Congress to 
imposing only those taxes, etc., as would raise revenue for “general” 
(national) purposes rather than merely for regional or special-interest 
(“partial”) purposes.20 This provision curbed congressional taxing auth-
ority even within the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. 
 
12. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
13. Infra Part II, notes 37–48 and accompanying text. 
14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
15. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
16. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  
17. Lawson, Seidman & Natelson, supra note 1. 
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
19. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937) (holding that Congress has 
discretion to spend for general welfare purposes); Steward Mach. Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 605 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (so noting); 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (stating such in dicta). 
20. See Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 1, at 9 (concluding that the 
founding fathers understood the General Welfare Clause to limit the 
raising of taxes for national purposes or common defense “rather than 
some local or special welfare”). The phrase “provide for” meant “making 
provision for the future.” Id. at 15–16. 
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 “Duties, Imposts and Excises” were to be “uniform throughout the 
United States.”21 
 The Constitution prohibited any “Preference [being] given by any 
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over 
those of another.”22 
 Two clauses required that “Capitation[s]” and other “direct Taxes” 
be apportioned among the states according to their population, with 
the provisos that (1) Indians who did not pay taxes were excluded23 
and (2) five slaves were to be counted as three free persons.24 These 
clauses were unamendable until 1808.25 
The terms examined in this study all occurred in the grants and 
limitations just summarized. “Tax,” “Duty,” “Excise,” “Impost,” and 
“Tonnage” occurred in the Taxation Clause. Three of those five words 
also appeared elsewhere in conjunctive and disjunctive expressions: 
“Tax or duty,”26 “Imposts or Duties,”27 “Duties and Imposts.”28 The 
phrase “direct . . . Taxes” appeared in two other locations.29 It is there-
fore reasonable to infer that, in accordance with the canon of construc-
tion against surplus, none of these individual terms was a synonym for 
any of the others. This does not preclude the possibility of overlap. 
The Constitution usually employed the word “Duty” in the context 
of trade: “Duty of Tonnage,”30 duties on imported slaves,31 duties on 
imports and exports.32 We can deduce that at least some duties were 
 
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
22. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
23. Id. art I., § 8, cl. 3. This referred to those Indians who were contributing 
citizens of their tribes rather than of state or federal governments. 
Natelson, Indian Commerce, supra note 1, at 260.  
24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
25. Id. art. V. 
26. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“Tax or Duty”). 
27. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“direct, Tax”). 
30. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
31. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
32. Id., art. I, § 10, cl. 2. See also id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall 
be laid on Articles exported from any State.”). 
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commercial in nature and that they were subject to the requirement of 
uniformity of “Regulation[s] of Commerce or Revenue.”33 
The text further distinguished between “direct Taxes” and other 
taxes. It stated outright that a “Capitation” was a direct tax, and it 
implied that there were other kinds of direct tax.34 Only direct taxes 
were to be apportioned among the states by population.35 Other taxes, 
presumably indirect, were not to be apportioned. A different require-
ment—uniformity—applied to duties, imposts, and excises.36 This 
suggests that to the extent the latter exactions were “taxes,” they were 
indirect. 
In sum: The text appeared to distinguish between regulations of 
commerce and taxes (“Revenue”); between taxes, duties, excises, and 
imposts; and between direct taxes and other (presumably indirect) 
taxes. It stated that capitations were direct and implied that there were 
other direct taxes as well. The text further implied that taxes in the 
form of duties, excises, or imposts were indirect. It stated explicitly that 
“duties” included “tonnage,” and it implied that duties were associated 
with commerce. Finally, the text imposed an apportionment rule on 
direct taxes and a uniformity requirement on other financial exactions. 
We now turn to sources of meaning outside the text of the 
Constitution. 
II. Impositions and Taxes 
In founding-era financial usage, imposition could refer to any 
pecuniary exaction by the government.37 A legislature might adopt an 
imposition purely for regulatory purposes—by, for example, levying 
tariffs high enough to inhibit foreign imports and thereby protect dom-
estic producers.38 Alternatively, it might enact an imposition to raise 
money for the expenses of government. 
 
33. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
34. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
35. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
36. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
37. E.g., 5 J. Cont’l Cong. 794 (Sept. 20, 1776) (referring to “duty or 
imposition” on necessities brought into a fort or garrison in new Articles 
of War); 1 Thomas Pownall, The Administration of the British 
Colonies 254 (5th ed. 1774) (labeling the monopoly in colonial trade, “an 
imposition, if not a direct tax, to the amount of the external balance of 
such trade”); 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *308 (referring to an excise 
as an inland imposition). 
38. E.g., Candidus II, Indep. Chron., Dec. 20, 1787, reprinted in 5 Doc-
umentary History, supra note 1, at 493, 497 (claiming that commercial 
regulations through imposts and excises would assist agriculture and 
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Some contemporaneous British sources defined the word “tax” in a 
way to render it essentially a synonym for “imposition.”39 Others 
confined “tax” to a levy that raised money for the support of govern-
ment.40 During the decade before the Revolutionary War, Americans 
settled on the latter usage.41 
Americans did so in reaction to British attempts to tax the colonies. 
In publications arguing the American cause, pamphleteers such as 
Richard Bland, John Adams, James Wilson, and, most notably, John 
Dickinson,42 conceded the authority of the British government to 
regulate commerce though financial exactions43—by, for example, 
charging fees to fund inspections and imposing prohibitory tariffs to 
restrict trade. In view of the history of American acceptance of British 
trade regulations, they could hardly do otherwise. However, the 
pamphleteers staunchly contested efforts by Parliament to “tax” them. 
They defined “tax” so as to exclude trade regulations: a financial 
imposition for the sole purpose of raising revenue.44 As Dickinson 
 
manufacturing); Agrippa IX, Mass. Gaz., Dec. 28, 1787, reprinted in 5 id. 
at 540, 542 (conceding that an impost could aid manufacturing); cf. 26 J. 
Cont’l Cong. 270 (Apr. 22, 1784) (reproducing letter referring to 
“[i]mposts or duties” as regulations of foreign commerce). 
39. E.g., Allen, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “tax” as “a tribute imposed; 
an excise. A charge or censure”); Jacob, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining 
“tax” in part as “[a] tribute or imposition laid upon the subject”); Sheridan, 
Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “tax” as “[a]n impost, a tribute imposed, 
an excise, a tallage; charge, censure”); David Hartley, Letters on the 
American War 78 (3d ed. London 1778) (“The Stamp Act was a tax.—The 
Tea Act was a tax. All Acts of Parliament upon this subject have been taxes, 
either for regulation of trade, or for revenue”). 
40. 10 Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 1,at 8548 (defining a “tax” 
as a levy “for the support of government”); 4 Chambers, supra note 1 
(defining “tax” as “a certain aid, subsidy, or supply . . . paid yearly 
toward the expences of the government”). 
41. For the development of the American definition, see Natelson, Origination 
Clause, supra note 1, at 666–68.  
42. On Dickinson’s career, see Robert G. Natelson, The Constitutional 
Contributions of John Dickinson, 108 Penn. St. L. Rev. 415 (2003). 
43. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 33 (“To the word ‘tax,’ I annex that meaning 
which the constitution and history of England require to be annexed to 
it; that it—that it is, an imposition on the subject, for the sole purpose of 
levying money.”); see also id. at 72–73 (“If money be raised upon us by 
others, without our consent, for our “defence,” those who are the judges 
in levying it, must also be the judges in applying it.”); Natelson, 
Origination Clause, supra note 1, at 666 (“Most American opinion-
molders conceded that Parliament . . . had authority to impose [restrict-
ive tariffs for regulating commerce].”). 
44. Natelson, Origination Clause, supra note 1, at 667. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
What the Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and 
“Taxes” (Direct or Otherwise) 
307 
insisted, “every ‘tax’ being an imposition, though every imposition is 
not a ‘tax.’”45 
By the time of the constitutional debates of 1787–90, the distinction 
between impositions for regulation and impositions for revenue had 
eroded somewhat. Americans no longer claimed that a tax must be for 
the sole purpose of raising revenue. They conceded that a tariff or excise 
that raised significant revenue still qualified as a tax if the legislature 
imposed with the incidental purpose of protecting domestic producers46 
or suppressing vice.47 Still, during the constitutional debates Americans 
considered exactions adopted primarily for regulatory purposes to be 
fundamentally different from taxes, which were enacted primarily for 
revenue. 
Several provisions in the Constitution reflected this distinction. The 
House-origination requirement, for example, applied only to “Bills for 
raising Revenue,”48 not to other financial exactions. The Uniformity 
Clause distinguished between regulations of “Commerce or Revenue.”49 
The Taxation Clause50 authorized only exactions for financial reasons;51 
the authority for regulatory exactions was the Commerce Clause.52 
The distinction between exactions for revenue and exactions for 
commerce affected the scope of federal powers granted by the Consti-
tution, specifically: 
 If an imposition was not designed to raise significant revenue but to 
regulate domestic or foreign commerce, then it was constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause. 
 
45. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 37. 
46. E.g., N.Y. Indep. J., Jul. 9, 1788, reprinted in 21 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 1307–08 (claiming taxes in the form of duties 
and imposts can assist domestic manufacturers); 6 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 1287 (quoting Thomas Dawes, Jr.) (telling the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention that Americans had not taken the 
opportunity to use imposts to protect agriculture). 
47. E.g., 1781 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 525 (reciting that one purpose 
of an excise statute was “the Suppression of Immorality, Luxury and 
Extravagance in this Commonwealth”). Of course, political discourse is never 
fully consistent, and even early in the Founding Era legislatures sometimes 
imposed “taxes” partly for nonrevenue reasons. Becker, supra note 1, at 13–
14, 80 (citing instances of taxes being imposed to promote development). 
48. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
49. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
50. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
51. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
52. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
What the Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and 
“Taxes” (Direct or Otherwise) 
308 
 If it raised no significant revenue and Congress had levied it to 
regulate an activity outside the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers 
(such as manufacturing was understood to be), then the imposition 
was outside congressional authority.53 
 If, however, the imposition was designed to raise significant revenue, 
it could qualify as constitutional under the Taxation Clause—even if 
it impacted activities otherwise outside the scope of Congress’s enum-
erated powers. 
The following three illustrations exemplify these rules: 
 Illustration # 1: Congress decides to assist the cotton trade by 
discouraging wool clothing. It imposes a $1 million levy on each 
imported wool item. Under the Constitution’s original legal force, this 
imposition was probably valid as a regulation of foreign commerce, even 
if (as is probable) it raised no revenue. 
 Illustration # 2: In an effort to assist the cotton trade by stamping 
out domestic manufacture of woolen garments, Congress imposes a $1 
million levy on American manufacturers for each item of wool clothing 
they make. Under the Constitution’s original legal force, this exaction 
would not qualify as a tax because it could not raise significant revenue. 
Nor would it qualify as a regulation of commerce because, by the 
founding era understanding, manufacturing was not “commerce.”54 
Illustration #3: In an effort to raise money and, incidentally, to 
assist the cotton trade, Congress imposes a ten percent retail sales levy 
on each item of wool clothing. Under the Constitution’s original legal 
force, this would be a valid “tax,” despite the incidental desire to affect 
behavior. 
III. Direct Taxes 
During the founding era, the distinction between direct and indirect 
taxes seems not to have been obscure. Among British sources, the 
distinction appears in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations55 (a text whose 
influence was greater among Americans than once believed),56 
 
53. Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 Nev. L.J. 469, 
487–88 (2003) (explaining that regulation of manufacturing was understood 
to be reserved to the states). 
54. Congress probably could levy such an exaction on the interstate sale of 
wool clothing, however, under the congressional power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
55. Smith, supra note 1. 
56. Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American 
Founders, 1776–1790, 59 Wm. & Mary Q. 897 (2002). 
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newspapers and pamphlets,57 Parliamentary proceedings,58 and govern-
ment documents.59 
American references to the distinction are, if anything, even more 
plentiful,60 and many Americans apparently were familiar with the 
criteria that classified a levy as “direct” or “indirect.” As John Marshall, 
the future Chief Justice, observed in a speech at the Virginia ratifying 
convention, “The objects of direct taxes are well understood.”61 
Marshall listed them as “[l]ands, slaves, stock [i.e., business capital] of 
all kinds, and a few other articles of domestic property.”62 Another 
future Chief Justice—Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth63—told his state’s 
ratifying convention that targets of direct taxes included (he did not 
say “were limited to”) the “tools of a man’s business . . . necessary 
utensils of his family.”64 Ellsworth thus corroborated Marshall’s refer-
ences to “stock” and “domestic property.” After the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention, delegates in the Anti-Federalist minority issued a 
statement that identified the subjects of direct taxes as those on polls 
 
57. Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Dec. 13, 1790 
(referring to “a direct Tax on Porter”); Public Advertiser (London), 
Dec. 13, 1790 (same); Gray, supra note 1, at 18, 34 (pamphlet referring 
to taxes on land and rents as “direct”). 
58. E.g., 27 Parliamentary Register, supra note 1, at 432–36 (H.C., Apr. 
16, 1790) (reproducing William Fullarton’s attack on the tobacco excise 
as functionally a “direct tax on the wages of labour”). Fullarton pointed 
out that a tax indirect in form can be direct in effect. See also 46 H.C. 
Jour. 45 (Dec. 9, 1790) (reproducing petition of John Horne Tooke, 
complaining of Westminster’s lack of representation in Parliament, 
although its citizens contribute “by direct and indirect Taxation”); see 
also 28 Cobbett, supra note 1, at 922 (same). 
59. E.g., Colonel Henderson, Remarks on the Abolition of Slavery (Feb. 16, 
1788), in Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council 
appointed for the Consideration of all Matters relating to 
Trade and Foreign Plantations (1789) (referring to a duty on 
imported slaves as an “indirect Tax”). 
60. In addition to the sources discussed infra, see 14 Min. Pa. Ex. Council, 
supra note 1, at 335, 337 (Feb. 1, 1785) (reproducing a 1785 report by 
then-Pennsylvania state president John Dickinson). 
61. 9 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1122. 
62. Id. 
63. Ellsworth was Connecticut’s leading lawyer, and had been a delegate at 
the Philadelphia convention, where he served on the committee that 
prepared the Constitution’s first draft. On Ellsworth, see William 
Garrott Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (1905). 
64. James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth, Speeches in the Conn. Convention 
(Jan. 7, 1788), reprinted in 15 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 275. 
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(as confirmed by the Constitution)65 and on “land, cattle, trades, 
occupations, etc.”66 The most highly regarded of the Anti-Federalist 
writers, the “Federal Farmer,” listed as objects of Congress’s power of 
direct taxation, “polls, lands, houses, labour, &c.”67 Remarks such as 
these strongly suggest that direct taxes included a good deal more than, 
as is sometimes claimed, land levies and capitations.68 
In fact, the scope of direct taxation was rather wide69—so much so 
that it offered the Anti-Federalists an opportunity for attack. The 
author signing his essay as “The Impartial Examiner” argued against 
granting Congress authority to levy direct taxes by pointing out that: 
So different are many species of property, so various the pro-
ductions, so unequal the profits arising, even from the same 
species of property, in different states, that no general mode of 
contribution can well be adopted in such a manner as at once to 
affect all in an equitable degree.70 
The Federalist rejoinder implicitly acknowledged the wide scope of 
direct taxes. Federalists such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, 
and George Nicholas responded by observing that the Constitution’s 
uniformity requirement applied only to indirect levies. Therefore, as 
long as Congress honored the apportionment rule, Congress could tailor 
the subjects of direct federal taxes to fit the needs of each state.71 “The 
most proper articles will be selected in each State,” said Madison. He 
 
65. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (referring to capitations as “direct”). 
66. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of 
the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted 
in 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 618, 636. 
67. Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. IX (Jan. 4, 1788), 
reprinted in 17 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 288, 294 (listing 
as objects of Congress’s power of direct taxation, “polls, lands, houses, 
labour, &c.”) (“&c” means “et cetera”). 
68. See also E. H. Ketcham, The Direct Tax Clause of the Federal Constitution, 
4 N.C. Hist. Rev. 270 (1927) (surveying the constitutional debates and 
concluding that direct taxes included levies on any kind of property). 
69. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 104. 
70. The Impartial Examiner I, Va. Indep. Chron., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted 
in 8 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 420, 421. 
71. 9 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1148–49 (quoting James 
Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention); The Federalist No. 36 
(Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 302, 304. 
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added that “[i]f one article in any State should be deficient, it will be 
laid on another article.”72 
The wide range of “articles” subject to direct tax reflects not merely 
a theoretical view but the actual operation of Anglo-American tax 
systems. Both in Britain and America, direct taxes commonly were 
imposed by omnibus statutes that combined a range of items into an 
integrated base and then imposed on the base one or more rates of tax. 
The base and the rate had various names; in colonial Connecticut, the 
base was called the “ratable estate” and the rate was the “colony pound 
rate.”73 
The valuation (or, to use the prevalent modern term, “assessment”) 
of each subject in the base was tailored to its nature. Head taxes varied 
according to the condition of the person being taxed.74 Real property 
might be assessed by an acreage or ad valorem formula,75 and personal 
property (such as livestock or plate) by the item or ad valorem. Income 
and profits usually were taxed by assessing a percentage, reflecting 
likely annual return, of the value of their sources. Among the sources 
subject to percentage assessment were interest-bearing loans (called 
“money at interest”),76 trades and businesses,77 and sometimes land.78 
 
72. 10 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1204 (quoting James 
Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention). See also id. at 1342 
(quoting Madison) (“Had taxes been uniform it would have been 
universally objected to”); id. at, 1343 (George Mason) (“It only meant 
that the quantum to be raised of each State, should be in proportion to 
their numbers in the manner therein directed. But the General 
Government was not precluded from laying the proportion of any 
particular State on any one species of property they might think proper.”). 
73. The colony pound rate was the rate per £1 of assessed value. Becker, 
supra note 1, at 27, 150. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text for 
more on the Connecticut system. 
74. Infra notes 105–119 and accompanying text. 
75. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 29 (referring to Virginia’s acreage tax); 46 
(referring to Virginia’s 1777 adoption of an ad valorem tax); 81 (referring 
to North Carolina’s acreage tax); 93 (referring to South Carolina’s ad 
valorem tax on urban land and acreage tax on rural land) & 103 (recording 
South Carolina’s 1784 switch to an ad valorem tax for rural land). Whether 
a state should tax land by the acre or ad valorem was a common matter of 
legislative dispute. See also Becker, supra note 1, at 5 (“Internal taxation 
was anything but a marginal topic for most colonists. Colony taxes were 
frequently of far more immediate concern to many . . . .”). 
76. Becker, supra note 1, at 168–69. 
77. Id. at 11, 46 (discussing the Massachusetts faculty tax and explaining that 
the Pennsylvania faculty tax fell on all trades and professions based on 
an estimate of annual profits). 
78. Id. at 34 (referring to land taxes calculated on annual rent). 
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When taxes were imposed on wealth-generating activities, they were 
said to be imposed on “facult[ies].”79 
The belief among some judges and commentators that direct taxes 
were limited to levies on heads and land may be attributable in part to 
the practice of the British Parliament and of some American juris-
dictions of labeling their omnibus tax laws as the “land tax,” even 
though those measures included far more than land in their assessable 
base. In Britain, for example, the so-called “land-tax” authorized 
exactions on various kinds of tangible personal property, on “money at 
interest,” and on government pensions, annuities and salaries.80 Similar-
ly, Pennsylvania’s “land tax” included levies on livestock, slaves, and 
indentured servants as well as land.81 The South Carolina direct tax 
statute imposed levies on carriages and slaves, stock-in-trade, and 
occupations, as well as real estate.82 A 1778 Virginia law exacted “an 
annual tax of ten shillings for each £100 value of all land, plate, slaves, 
horses and mules and ‘all salaries, and . . . the neat [sic] income of all 
offices of profit.’”83 New Hampshire’s statute covered polls, land 
(including mills and wharves), livestock, and ferries.84  
   
 
79. Before the Revolution, all the New England colonies had adopted faculty 
taxes. Id. at 11. 
80. 3 Chambers, supra note 1 (stating in his entry on the Land-Tax that the 
tax was assessed on personalty as well as land, exempting items owned by 
the king; and also on income from public office or employment (“military 
officers in the army or navy excepted”) and on government annuities and 
pensions to the tune of four shillings for every twenty received). See also 1 
Blackstone, supra note 1, at *302 (stating that the land tax was imposed 
on personal as well as real property); but see id. at *315 (stating that the 
tax on offices and pensions was administered by the commissioners of the 
land tax, suggesting that it was technically a different levy). See also 13 
Anne, c. 1 (1713) (setting for the text of the land tax). 
 See also 4 THOMAS B. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2613/2613-h/2613-h.htm (describing the 
enactment and composition of the land tax, and referring to it as “direct 
taxation”); Mark Pearsall, The Land Tax 1692-1963, 22 MAG. FRIENDS 
OF THE NAT’L ARCHIVES 16 (2011) (describing the tax). 
81. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 88–89. 
82. S.C. Laws, supra note 1, at 436; Becker, supra note 1, at 207. 
83. Becker, supra note 1, at 196 (quoting 1778 Virginia tax law). See also 
Einhorn, supra note 1, at 46–47 (describing the changes made to 
Virginia’s tax in 1778); Dodd, supra note 1, at 363 (describing Virginia’s 
“Revenue tax” and listing several other items). 
84. 21 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 420–21. 
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After Independence, Connecticut became known for its “shockingly 
high taxes.”85 In 1777, that state’s legislature integrated a business 
profits levy into its land tax code by requiring town assessors to include 
gross profits in the “ratable estate.” By the same technique, the 
legislature extended the land tax to cattle and sheep the taxpayer had 
loaned to others.86 A 1779 Connecticut statute imposed a head tax and 
required that the following items be wrapped into the ratable estate: 
land, improvements to land, cattle, horses, swine, ships and other 
vessels, coaches and other vehicles, clocks and watches, silver plate, all 
individual net wealth exceeding £50 (!), income from interest received 
on loans, traders’ and shopkeepers’ inventory, the individual businesses 
of attorneys at law, the profits of ironworks and other enterprises, and 
(subject to particularly high rates) the businesses of speculators.87 
As a colony, Massachusetts had imposed a faculty tax that levied 
on “‘the incomes or profits which any person or persons . . . do or shall 
receive from any trade, faculty, business or employment what so ever, 
and all profits which shall or may arise by money or commissions of 
profit, in their improvement.’”88 In 1780, the Commonwealth enacted a 
law imposing a unified tax on polls (males, both free and slave), land, 
livestock, interest income, business income, plate, “vessels of all sorts,” 
money on hand, business inventory,89 grain and other “produce of the 
land, and all other property whatsoever” not specifically exempt.90 The 
exempt items were “household furniture, wearing apparel, farming 
utensils, and the tools of mechanicks.”91 The same statute provided for 
exemptions for particular professions and for the poor.92 
Almost every American jurisdiction seems to have had a similar, if 
sometimes less elaborate, arrangement, whether or not a poll tax was 
part of it.93 
These statutes, corroborated by additional sources, reveal that 
taxes were direct when levied on the following items: 
 
85. Becker, supra note 1, at 153. 
86. 1 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 365–66 (reproducing statute). 
87. 2 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 256–63. 
88. Becker, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting a Massachusetts’ faculty tax). 
89. 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85. Presumably because carriages held 
as inventory (i.e., for sale) were taxed directly, the carriage excise (an indirect 
tax) was not imposed on them. 1781 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 578. 
90. 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85–86. 
91. Id. at 86. 
92. Infra notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text. 
93. Becker, supra note 1, at 44, 46, 88, 192, 213 (discussing similar arrangements 
in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland). 
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 Wealth employed in business and domestic life. Direct taxes included 
those imposed on land,94 improvements to land,95 inventory (“stock in 
trade),96 business equipment,97 and livestock.98 
 
94. E.g., 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85 (discussing taxes on real 
estate). See also Gray, supra note 1, at 18 (referring to land taxes as 
direct); An Old Planter, Va. Indep. Chron., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 
8 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 394, 396 (noting that under 
the Constitution taxes on land will be apportioned as direct taxes); 9 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1149 (reproducing remarks of 
James Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention, describing the land 
levies of England and Scotland as direct taxes). 
95. Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. IX (Jan. 4, 1788), 
reprinted in 17 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 288, 294 (listing 
“houses” as a possible object of Congress’s power of direct taxation). Thus 
the English window tax, imposed so as to ensure that the owners of more 
elaborate houses paid more, was direct. Diary; or, Woodfall’s 
Register (London), Apr. 2, 1789 (calling the window light tax direct in 
an announcement of pamphlets by J.L. DeLolme, the well-known author 
of a book on the English constitution). 
96. E.g., 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85 (including as part of a 
direct tax scheme, levies on “wares and merchandize, stock in trade”). 
Becker, supra note 1, cites many examples of such stock-in-trade taxes, 
e.g., id. at 81, 207 (South Carolina), 171 (New Jersey), 192 (North 
Carolina). An English newspaper referred to a proposed levy on ale of up 
to a half-penny “per pot” as “a direct Tax on Porter.” Gazetteer and 
New Daily Advertiser (London), Dec. 13, 1790; see also Public 
Advertiser (London), Dec. 13, 1790 (characterizing the proposed tax 
similarly). A pottle was a jar of two quarts or four pints. John Playford, 
Vade Mecum: or, The Necessary Pocket Companion 46 (22d ed., 
1772); Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 1 (unpaginated) (defining 
“pottle” as four pints). The quantities assessed suggest that the levy was 
on inventory rather than retail sale. A Massachusetts excise statute 
assessed liquor by the gallon, but only as part of a formula to determine 
the amount sold. 1781 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 525–26. 
97. 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85 (taxing “vessels of all sorts”). 
See also 21 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 420–21 (identifying ferries as 
part of the New Hampshire direct tax system). 
98. Supra notes 62 & 66 and accompanying text (quoting John Marshall and 
the dissent of the Pennsylvania minority); An Old Planter, Va. Indep. 
Chron., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 394, 396 (noting that under the Constitution taxes on livestock 
would be apportioned as direct taxes); 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 
1, at 85 (taxing as part of a general direct tax scheme, “horses, oxen and 
cattle . . . sheep, swine”); Becker, supra note 1, at 192 (referencing 
North Carolina’s tax on horses and cattle). 
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 Personal and business income. Direct taxes included levies on rents,99 
business profits,100 wages,101 interest,102 and other income.103 
 Business enterprises. Levies on business profits and occupational fees 
were direct taxes.104 
 
99. Gray, supra note 1, at 18, 34–35 (referring to taxes on land rents as 
direct). Beginning in 1777, New Hampshire taxed unimproved land at the 
same rate as “money at interest,” thereby effectively taxing rental value. 
Becker, supra note 1, at 130. 
100. See supra notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text (discussing the Connecticut 
system). 
101. Smith, supra note 1, at 348–49, 353 (referring to taxes on wages as direct); 
27 Parliamentary Register, supra note 1, at 432–36 (H.C., Apr. 15, 
1790) (reproducing William Fullarton’s attack on the tobacco excise as 
functionally a “direct tax on the wages of labour”). Fullarton pointed out 
that a tax indirect in form can be direct in effect. See also Letter from 
the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. IX (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 
17 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 288, 294 (listing as objects 
of Congress’s power of direct taxation, “polls, lands, houses, labour, &c.”). 
102. 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85 (directly taxing net interest 
received); cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 331–32 (describing tax on interest 
as direct). 
103. Smith, supra note 1, at 350 (classifying a tax on salaries from emoluments 
as direct); supra notes 80, 83 & 87-89 and accompanying text. 
104. 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 86 (directly taxing “income from any 
profession, faculty, handicraft, trade or employment; and also on the amount 
of all incomes and profits gained by trading by sea and on shore”); supra note 
87 and accompanying text (describing the Connecticut system); Dodd, supra 
note 1, at 364 (describing Virginia’s occupational fees on physicians, surgeons, 
apothecaries, and merchants); Becker, supra note 1, at 44 (summarizing 
New Jersey taxes on various occupations), 81 (summarizing South Carolina 
occupational taxes). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
What the Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and 
“Taxes” (Direct or Otherwise) 
316 
 Heads.105 Poll taxes, also called head taxes or capitations,106 existed 
in all of the New England states107 and in most other states as well.108 
They were levied both on free persons and slaves. Capitations were the 
prevalent way of taxing slaves.109 
Laws imposing capitations did not necessarily require the same 
payment from everyone. Rates often were adjusted according to the 
taxpayer’s circumstances, just as the capitations known as “council 
taxes” are graduated in Britain today.110 American legislatures could,  
105. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. See also Smith, supra note 1, at 353 (stating 
that “[c]apitation taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of 
the people, are direct taxes upon the wages of labour”); William R. 
Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress 648 (Reuben 
Aldridge Guild, A.M. eds., Providence, Providence Press Company 1870) 
(quoting discussion at the Rhode Island ratifying convention that refers 
to a poll tax or capitation as direct). 
106. Campbell, supra note 1, at 124 (arguing that the term “capitation” had a 
meaning different from “poll tax” because a capitation could be adjusted 
by income and other factors). I could find no persuasive evidence for this 
distinction. Poll taxes were often so adjusted, and contemporaneous 
dictionaries, to the extent that they provided a definition for capitation, 
define it simply as a poll tax. E.g., Ash, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining 
“capitation” as “[a] numeration of the people by the head, a poll tax”); 
Perry, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “capitation” as “numeration 
by heads, a poll tax”). 
107. Becker, supra note 1, at 15. 
108. During the colonial period there were no statewide poll taxes in New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and probably Delaware, although there were some 
local poll taxes, Becker, supra note 1, at 48–49, and Pennsylvania imposed 
them only on single men. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 83, 90. During this period 
South Carolina imposed capitations only on slaves. Id. at 99. The 1776 
Maryland constitution abolished poll taxes. Md. Const. art. 13 (1776). 
109. In theory, slaves could be taxed either as persons (by a head tax) or as 
livestock. In America, they seem to have been taxed as persons. Letter 
from George Nicholas (Feb. 16, 1788), in 16 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 123, 126 (“A poll tax is the only tax [Congress] could 
impose which could affect our slaves . . . .”). See also Becker, supra note 
1, at 77 (discussing the poll taxes “on all blacks, slave or free, male or 
female, over the age of twelve” in North Carolina); Md. Stat. 1719 ch. 
xvi (imposing a poll tax on black and Irish servants, a measure re-enacted 
from time to time); 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 85 (imposing 
poll taxes on free and enslaved males); 8 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 
685, 849 (imposing a poll tax on slaves); 21 id. at 124 (proposing a poll 
tax on “male and female negroes and molatto [sic] Servants,” a proposal 
apparently was defeated, id. at 420); S.C. Laws, supra note 1, at 159 
(reproducing a statute imposing a tax on white and black males); id. at 
496 (imposing a head tax on blacks and mixed-race people). 
110. I had to pay a local capitation when residing temporarily in the City of 
Oxford, England. See Who is Liable to Pay Council Tax, Oxford City 
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and often did, reduce or eliminate the poll tax due from the poor.111 
American legislatures also granted complete or partial exemptions to 
persons who lived in particular places,112 who had reached (or not 
reached) a stated age,113 who were married,114 or who pursued particular 
 
Counsel (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.oxford.gov.uk/PageRender/decCB/ 
Payment_occw.htm [http://perma.cc/7G72-YJNM] (describing who must 
pay council tax in Oxford). 
111. Jensen, supra note 1, at 2392; 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 87 
(providing for reduction of taxes on “persons who through age, infirmity or 
poverty are unable to pay . . . or any widows or orphans who, depending 
on the interest of their money for subsistence”); 2 Conn. Records, supra 
note 1, at 302 (exemption for hardship and poverty); id. at 335 (exemption 
for hardship); id. at 484 (exemption for hardship and poverty); id. at 486 
(same); 3 id. at 201 (exemption for poverty); 328 (exemption for hardship); 
4 id. at 309 (exemption for hardship and for status as a minister); 5 id. at 
168 (same); id. at 242–43 (same); 21 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 124 
(proposed exemption for “paupers and Idiots”); Becker, supra note 1, at 143 
(mentioning Rhode Island’s exemption for the poor); id. at 176 (mentioning 
Delaware’s exemption for the poor, for people with many children, and for 
widows). 
 In France, a person’s capitation liability was graduated by a wide range 
of factors. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 13. 
112. E.g., 2 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 198 (exemption of citizens of 
town of Union); 3 id. at 203 (same for the Town of Barkhemsted); id. at 
535 (same for Town of Westmoreland); 20 Mass. Resolves, supra note 
1, at 288, 387 (1778) (allowing abatement of taxes on “polls and estates” 
for inhabitants of two towns). 
113. S.C. Laws, supra note 1, at 159 (reproducing a statute imposing tax on 
white and black males, but exempting those under 16 years of age or over 
60); 21 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 124 (proposed exemption for whites 
over 70 and servants of color over 45); 8 id. at 685, 849 (exempting slaves 
over 45); id. at 966 (exempting whites over 75 and blacks over 45). See 
also Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (discussing a reduction in Connecticut 
poll tax for males aged 16 to 21). 
114. Becker, supra note 1, at 182–83 (mentioning Pennsylvania’s poll tax on 
unmarried men). 
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occupations—especially the military115 and the clergy.116 The Mass-
achusetts legislature, for example, exempted soldiers,117 the staff of 
Harvard College, and “settled Ministers of the Gospel [and] Grammar 
School-Masters.”118 The Connecticut legislature exempted the president 
of Yale University.119 Nevertheless, capitations tended to be less reflect-
ive of wealth or income than other levies, which accounts for their 
unpopularity. 
Despite the variety among the objects of direct taxation, one can 
divine a unifying principle: A tax was direct if it was imposed on 
people’s lives, homes, or on the productive occupations by which they 
supported and expressed themselves. Direct taxes, in other words, were 
levies on living and producing. 
IV. Indirect Taxes 
A. Indirect Taxes in General 
Indirect taxes were those taxes that were not direct. Stated more 
positively, indirect taxes were those “duties” imposed not principally 
for regulation but for the raising of revenue. The term duty is defined 
more closely below;120 suffice to say for current purposes that the word 
encompassed, but was not limited to, excises, imposts, and tonnage. 
The principal targets of indirect taxation were consumption 
(especially of luxuries), domestic and foreign trade, and enumerated 
business and official transactions. 
At the Connecticut ratifying convention, Oliver Ellsworth argued 
that, as a rule, indirect taxes were preferable to direct taxes: 
Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue. 
To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must 
be constantly laying up money to answer the demands of the 
collector. But you cannot make people thus provident; if you  
115. E.g., 2 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 182, 229, 233, 262, 526; 3 id. at 
19, 121, 319 (exempting soldiers); 8 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 685, 
843 (exempting soldiers and sailors); 2 id. at 184 (exempting certain 
veterans); Va. H.D. Jour., at 9 (May 15, 1778) (exemptions for soldiers). 
See also Becker, supra note 1, at 143, 196, 199. 
116. 2 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 260; 3 id. at 418; 4 id. at 216 
(exempting ministers); 20 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 197–98 
(1777) (exempting missionaries); 21 id. at 651 (1780) (same); Becker, 
supra note 1, at 143 (reporting Rhode Island’s exemption for ministers). 
117. 21 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 177–78. 
118. 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 87. 
119. 2 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 260. 
120. Infra Part IV.B.1. 
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would do any thing to purpose, you must come in when they are 
spending, and take a part with them. This does not take away 
the tools of a man’s business, or the necessary utensils of his 
family: It only comes in, when he is taking his pleasure, and feels 
generous, when he is laying out a shilling for superfluities.121 
* * * 
All nations have seen the necessity and propriety of raising a 
revenue by indirect taxation, by duties upon articles of consump-
tion. France raises a revenue of 24 Millions Sterling per annum, 
and it is chiefly in this way. 50 Millions of Livres they raise upon 
the single article of Salt. The Swiss cantons raise almost the whole 
of their revenue upon Salt. Those States purchase all the Salt 
which is to be used in the country; they sell it out to the people 
at an advanced price; the advance is the revenue of the country. 
In England, the whole public revenue is about 12 Millions Sterling 
per annum. The land tax amounts to about 2 Millions, the 
window and some other taxes to about two millions more. The 
other 8 Millions is raised upon articles of consumption. . . . In 
Holland their prodigious taxes amounting to forty shillings for 
each inhabitant, are levied chiefly upon articles of consumption. 
They excise every thing, not excepting even their houses of 
infamy.122 
Ellsworth proceeded to offer predictions of how indirect taxes might 
raise revenue for the federal government. 
B. The Terminology of Indirect Taxation 
1. Duties 
Eighteenth century British lay dictionaries defined “duty” widely 
enough to include almost any financial exaction,123 and Blackstone  
121. 15 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 275. 
122. 15 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 275. Ellworth’s arguments 
were echoed by Connecticutensus: To the People of Connecticut, Am. 
Mercury (Dec. 31, 1787), reprinted in 3 Documentary History 512, 
513, and by George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention. 9 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 999–1000. See also 22 J. 
Cont’l Cong. 441 (Aug. 5, 1782) (reproducing a report of the Confed-
eration Office of Finance stating of excises, “Of all Taxes those on the 
consumption of articles are most agreeable, because being mingled with 
the price, they are less sensible to the people”). 
123. Ash, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “Duty” as a “tax, impost”); Perry, 
Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “Duty” as a “tax”); 1 Sheridan, 
Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “Duty” as a “tax, impost, custom, toll”). 
Cf. 4 Chambers, supra note 1 (referring in an entry on “tax” to the direct 
tax on houses and windows as a “duty”). For the window tax as direct, see 
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employed the term the same way.124 However, commercial treatises used 
the word more narrowly. For example, Giles Jacob in his Lex 
Mercatoria, defined “duty” to encompass “Customs, Subsidies, Tolls, 
Imposts, and other Duties upon Commodities imported or exported.”125 
By 1787, Americans had developed their own usage, employing the 
word “duty” specifically to mean any financial exaction that did not 
qualify as a direct tax.126 Therefore, not all duties were taxes: Some 
were imposed not for revenue but merely to regulate (or effectively 
prohibit) trade in particular articles.127 
 
Diary; or, Woodfall’s Register (London), Apr. 2, 1789 (calling the 
window light tax direct in an announcement of pamphlets by J.L. DeLolme.). 
124. E.g., 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *311 (referring to the “duty for the 
carriage of letters”); Id. at *313 (referring to the “duty on houses and 
windows”); Id. at *315 (referring to the “duty on offices and pensions”). 
125. Jacob, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 1, at 116 (italics added). See also 
Rolt, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “Duty” as including “an 
impost or tax . . . on merchandises, and commodities, either exported 
from their own country, imported from abroad, or consumed at home, 
towards supporting the expenses of the government”). 
126. E.g., A Farmer, Phila. Freeman’s J., Apr. 16 & 23, 1788, reprinted in 17 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 133, 139–40 (“Under the term 
duties, every species of indirect taxes is included”). See also infra for 
citations on the uses of “duty,” “excise,” “impost,” and “tonnage.” Many 
are from the congressional journals issued between 1774 and 1790, and are 
illustrative only. Citation of all references would yield an unwieldy result. 
127. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IV, para. 1 (referring to duties 
imposed on commerce among states); 1 Annals of Cong. 194–95 (1789) 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting Jeremiah Wadsworth as referring to the 
use of protective duties to encourage manufactures). At the federal 
convention, George Clymer sought to limit export “duties” to those for 
regulatory purposes only. 2 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 363 
(reporting that George Clymer “moved as a qualification of the power of 
taxing Exports that it should be restrained to regulations of trade, <by 
inserting after the word ‘duty’ Sect 4 art VII the words> ‘for the purpose 
of revenue.’”). James Madison was a supporter of using financial exactions 
to create trade preferences. 1 Annals of Cong. 193–94, 196–97 
(reporting Madison’s argument). 
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In America, the word “duties” included levies on imports128 and 
exports,129 whether imposed for revenue or to regulate commerce. Duties 
imposed on imports and exports also were called customs,130 although 
the latter word seems to have been less common in America than  
in Britain. An example of a custom was the specialized levy called 
tonnage.131 
An excise was also a kind of duty.132 Other duties included ad hoc 
impositions on specific transactions or events, such as fees imposed on 
 
128. E.g., 1 J. Cont’l Cong. 79 (Oct. 20, 1774) (referring to duties on tea, wine 
and other articles imported); id. at 85 (Oct. 21, 1774) (reproducing letter of 
Congress referring to import duty on tea); 13 id. at 220 (Feb. 22, 1779) 
(reproducing a plan for a treaty with Holland referring to “duties or imposts” 
on goods coming into the United States); 18 id. at 1161 (Dec. 18, 1780) 
(referring to duties on imports; duties on exports and tonnage); 14 Min. Pa. 
Ex Council, supra note 1, at 334 (Feb. 1, 1785) (reproducing report of the 
state president, John Dickinson, referring to “duties upon importations”); 1 
Annals of Cong. 77 (reporting a bill pertaining to “duties imposed by law 
on the tonnage of ships or vessels and on goods, wares, and merchandises 
imported into the United States”); id. at 106 (listing salt among other subjects 
of proposed import duties); 5 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 328–38 
(reproducing statute imposing import duties); Va. Sen. Jour. at 87 (Jan. 8, 
1787) (referring to a duty on imports). See also id. at 75 (Jan. 2, 1788) 
(discussing duties on both imports and exports). 
129. 5 J. Cont’l Cong. 580 (July 18, 1776) (referring to duties on exports in a 
draft treaty); 23 id. at 807 (Dec. 16, 1782) (referring to “[d]uties on exports”); 
A Freeholder, Va. Indep. Chron., reprinted in 9 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 719, 724 (referring to an export duty on tobacco); Va. Sen. 
Jour. at 58 (Dec. 22, 1786) (referring to a duty on exported tobacco). See 
also id. at 75 (Jan. 2, 1788) (discussing duties on both imports and exports). 
130. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 14; Perry, Dictionary supra note 1 (defining 
“Custom” as the “king’s duties on imports and exports”); Rolt, 
Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “customs” as “the dues, duties, tolls, 
or tax, paid by merchants to the King, or state, for carrying out and 
bringing in of merchandises; which, in Great Britain, are duties, certain 
and perpetual, payable to the crown for goods exported and imported”); 
1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *303 (providing a similar definition). 
131. Jacob, Dictionary, supra note 1 (referring to tonnage as “a custom”). 
132. 1781 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 525 (reciting in an excise statute 
the payment of excise “duties”); 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, 132 
(referring to “excise duties”); id. at 135 (“excise duty”); 1801 N.Y. Laws 
439–43 (reproducing statute imposing a “duty of excise” on strong drink); 
15 Min. Pa. Ex. Council, supra note 1, at 305 (Oct. 26, 1787) (repro-
ducing letter from Pennsylvania state president Benjamin Franklin referring 
to “excise duties”). See also Candidus II, Indep. Chron., Dec. 20, 1787, 
reprinted in 5 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 493, 497 (referring 
to both imposts and excises as duties). 
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goods brought into a fort or garrison,133 fees on vessels for using public 
wharves,134 fees on auction sales,135 fees on legal proceedings,136 and 
charges on certain written documents.137 The notorious pre-Revolution 
Stamp Tax was a kind of duty.138 It was imposed on court orders, ship 
clearances, deeds, mortgages, licenses, pamphlets, newspapers, gam-
bling supplies, and even college diplomas.139 
2. Imposts 
English dictionaries often defined “impost” very broadly. Johnson’s 
Dictionary, for example, described it as “[a] tax; a toll; a custom 
paid.”140 However, Giles Jacob’s New Law-Dictionary, the most popular 
work of its kind in America,141 limited the term to only exactions on 
 
133. 5 J. Cont’l Cong. 794 (Sept. 20, 1776) (referring to “duty or imposition” 
on necessities brought into a fort or garrison). 
134. Va. Sen. Jour. at 56 (Dec. 9, 1789) (referring to a proposed duty “vessels 
coming to, or using the public wharves”). 
135. 15 Min. Pa. Ex Council, supra note 1, at 152 (Jan. 23, 1787). 
136. 5 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 339–40 (reproducing statute). 
137. Luther Martin, Genuine Information VI, Balt. Md. Gazette, Jan. 15, 
1788, reprinted in 15 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 374, 376; 
A Farmer, Phila. Freeman’s J., Apr. 16 & 23, 1788, reprinted in 17 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 133, 139–40 (“Under the term 
duties, every species of indirect taxes is included, but it especially means 
the power of levying money upon printed books and written instruments”); 
Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. III (Oct. 10, 1787), 
reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 218, 224–25 
(referring to duties on written instruments). 
138. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *312, *313 (explaining stamp duties). 
139. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 18. 
140. Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 1. Cf. Allen, Dictionary, supra note 
1 (defining “impost” as “a toll; custom paid for goods or merchandize”). 
 There is no linguistic connection between “impost” and “import.” The 
prefix in “impost” (as in “imposition”) means “on”—from the Latin in-
ponere (imponere, to place on); the like prefix in “import” means “into:” 
in-portare (importare, to carry into). 
141. See generally Herbert A. Johnson, Imported Eighteenth-Century 
Law Treatises in American Libraries, 1700–1799, at 59–64 (1978) 
(discussing the popularity in America of law treatises, including Jacob’s 
Dictionary). 
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imports,142 which necessarily rendered an impost a kind of duty.143 
Americans seem to have adopted that usage almost exclusively.144 Thus, 
Massachusetts called its import duty an impost.145 The Confederation 
Congress made repeated attempts to induce the states to approve a five 
percent “impost” on imports, including the import of foreign prizes.146 
In founding era discourse, one could speak of a “duty” being im-
posed on either imports or exports.147 It also was common to couple the 
word “imposts” on imports with “duties” on exports.148 
3. Tonnage 
Tonnage (originally “tunnage”) had begun as a Medieval import 
duty on “tuns” (casks) of wine.149 By the time of the Founding, the 
 
142. Jacob, Dictionary, supra note 1 (stating in its entry for “Impost,” that 
it “Signifieth the tax received by the Prince, for such merchandize as are 
brought into any haven within his dominions from foreign nations. It may 
in some sort be distinguished from custom, because custom is rather that 
profit the prince maketh of wares shipped out; yet they are frequently 
confounded.”). See also Rolt, Dictionary, supra note 1 (adopting the 
same limitations in defining “impost”). 
143. E.g., 20 N.H. Papers, supra note 1, at 157 (“Impost Duty”), 198 (same). 
144. E.g., 1782 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 152 (laying an “Impost” “at the 
Time and Place of Importation”); 18 J. Cont’l Cong. 1164 (Dec. 18, 1780) 
(referring to imposts on imports); 22 id. at 439 (Aug. 5, 1782) (reproducing a 
report of the Confederation Office of Finance referring to “an excise of one 
eighth of dollar per gallon” on liquor and to 5% impost on imports and prizes 
of war); 1 Annals of Cong. 193–94 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting 
Madison as treating as an impost a duty on the import of Madeira); id. at 
196 (quoting Thomas Fitzsimmons as referring to an import duty on rum as 
an impost and distinguishing it from “excise or direct taxes”). Cf. Articles 
of Confederation of 1781, art. VI, para. 3 (referring to imposts and duties 
in treaties). But see 16 J. Cont’l Cong. 261 (Mar. 18, 1780) (reproducing 
motion by Thomas Burke for an “impost” on exports and imports). 
145. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 55. 
146. E.g., 18 J. Cont’l Cong. 1035 (Nov. 8, 1780) (reproducing a draft 
Congressional recommendation for a five percent impost on foreign prizes). 
147. Supra notes 128 & 129. 
148. E.g., Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (referring to 
imposts and duties on foreigners and on importation and exportation); 
Brutus VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 234, 239. 
149. It should be contrasted with “poundage,” an ad valorem tax on all 
imported and exported goods. Tonnage and Poundage, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/topic/tonnage-and-poundage 
[http://perma.cc/J93G-37P9]. See also WALTER PHELPS HALL & ROBERT 
GREENHALGH ALBION, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
151 (2nd ed. 1946) (stating that initially a duty of two shillings per ton 
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term had broadened into any duty150 levied on the carrying capacity of 
ships.151 It could be imposed on ships either importing or exporting. In 
1787, for example, Virginia imposed a tonnage duty of six shillings per 
ton on all vessels entering and clearing the harbors of that state.152 
4. Excises 
An excise was a species of duty.153 Excises sometimes were referred 
to as “inland impositions”154 because they were the domestic equivalent 
of duties on imports and exports.155 They were imposed in Britain156 and 
in various American states.157 
 
(“tun”) on a cask of foreign wine was called “tunnage,” while a duty of 
one penny for each pound’s worth of merchandize was “poundage”). 
150. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“Duty of Tonnage”). See also 18 J. Cont’l 
Cong. 1161 (Dec. 18, 1780) (referring to duties on tonnage); 1 Annals 
of Cong. 75 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting a bill title referring 
to “duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, 
wares, and merchandises imported into the United States”); id. at 176 
(reporting a motion for a “duty” of 6 cents per ton on citizens owning 
vessels); id. at 177 (quoting John Lawrance [erroneously spelled “Lawrence”] 
referring to a “duty on tonnage”); Va. H.D. Jour. at 61 (Jun. 17, 1784) 
(referring to “duties payable upon tonnage”). 
151. Jacob, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining tonnage as “a custom or 
impost paid to the King for merchandize carried out, or brought in ships, 
or such like vessels, according to a certain rate upon every ton”). 
152. Dodd, supra note 1, at 363. See also 1 Annals of Cong. 185–86 (quoting 
John Lawrance [erroneously spelled “Lawrence”] as claiming a duty of 
tonnage on exports would raise prices and be in effect an unconstitutional 
tax on exports). 
153. Supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
154. 4 Chambers, supra note 1 (stating, in entry on “tax”, that “the excise-
duty . . . an inland imposition, paid sometimes upon the consumption of the 
commodity, or frequently upon the retail sale, which is the last stage before 
the consumption”); 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *308 (calling an excise 
an inland imposition paid on consumption and frequently on retail sale). 
155. 25 J. Cont’l Cong. 881 (Jan. 29, 1783) (reporting James Wilson as referring 
to an “impost on trade” but an “excise” on wine, spirits, and coffee). 
156. Rolt, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “excise” as specifically 
referring to “[a] duty, or imposition, charged on beer, ale, cyder, and other 
malt-liquors made for sale, within the kingdom . . .” but adding that other 
British excises included levies on salt, sweets, wine, candles, paper, vellum 
and parchment, and paper). 
157. E.g., Becker, supra note 1, at 11–12 (referring to colonial Massachusetts 
excise); id. at 126 (post-Independence Massachusetts excise); id. at 46 
(referring to the New York excise); id. at 65 (referring to the Pennsylvania 
excise); id. at 144 (referring to a temporary Rhode Island excise). See also infra 
notes 191–196 and accompanying text (discussing the Connecticut excise). 
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In both British and American usage, an excise was a domestic tax 
on the consumption of commodities,158 especially manufactured goods.159 
An excise might be imposed on all goods of a particular character or 
only on foreign goods of that character—such as foreign watches or 
clocks.160 What rendered the latter an excise rather than an impost is 
that it was not levied at the time of import but upon consumption 
within the jurisdiction. If the product was re-exported rather than 
consumed within the jurisdiction, no excise was imposed.161 
Although an excise might be levied either to regulate commerce or 
raise revenue, usually the primary motivation was to raise revenue. 
Often, however, there was a subsidiary interest in discouraging con-
sumption of the items excised.162 
One commentator has argued that excises were direct taxes or at 
least were widely seen as direct,163 but support for that conclusion is 
very slender.164 The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that excises  
158. Ash, Dictionary, supra note 1 (defining “Excise” as “An imposition or tax 
laid on a commodity by act of parliament”); Sheridan, Dictionary, supra 
note 1 (defining “excise” as “An inland tax levied upon commodities”). 
159. The Impartial Examiner I, Va. Indep. Chron., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 
8 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 420, 421 (referring to excises 
as taxes “arising out of manufactures”); 9 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 1133 (quoting George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention 
describing excises as “a kind of tax on manufactures”); The Federalist 
No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 268, 269 (stating that “the proper objects” of excises 
“particular kinds of manufactures”); 22 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 1998 (quoting John Lansing, Jr., referring to “excises on all articles 
of American manufacture”). 
160. Jacob, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 1, at 120 (referring to “an Excise or 
Impost upon foreign Beer”); 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 131 
(excising imported watches and clocks at retail). 
161. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 137 (exempting excised foreign 
articles if exported from the state). 
162. 22 J. Cont’l Cong. 439, 442 (Aug. 5, 1782) (reproducing a report of the 
Confederation Office of Finance suggesting “an excise of one eighth of dollar 
per gallon” on liquor and stating that “[t]he Tax will be a means of compelling 
vice to support the cause of virtue”); 1781 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 
525 (reciting in an excise statute that one purpose was “the Suppression of 
Immorality, Luxury and Extravagance in this Commonwealth”). 
163. Johnson, Fixing, supra note 1, at 316–17. 
164. Professor Johnson relies on three passages from the ratification debates. 
Two of these simply do not support his conclusion. The other passage is 
Brutus V, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 410, 415 (stating that “direct taxes . . . include poll taxes, 
land taxes, excises, duties on written instruments”). There are two reasons 
for not crediting that passage. First, it stands alone against massive 
testimony to the contrary. Supra note 29. Second, the context is a discussion 
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were seen as a category distinct from direct taxes.165 This is also implied 
by the Constitution’s text.166 A similar argument—that the Consti-
tution’s framers were excluding excises from direct taxes for the first 
time167—is disproved by the preamble to a Massachusetts excise statute, 
adopted a year before the Constitution was written, reciting that the 
excise was adopted in part “to ease the people as much as possible of 
direct taxation.”168 
 
of external vs. internal taxes. After addressing external taxes, Brutus turns 
to internal taxes (which an excise certainly is) but called them “direct” 
rather than “internal” by what was probably an inadvertent error. 
165. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 130 (reciting that excises were being 
imposed to avoid direct taxes); Agrippa XVII, Mass. Gazette, Feb. 5, 1788, 
reprinted in 5 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 863, 865 (reciting 
direct taxes and excises separately); 6 Documentary History, supra note 
1, at 1245–46 (quoting Thomas Dawes, Jr. at the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention, distinguishing between direct taxes, imposts, and excises); id. at 
1290 (quoting Theodore Sedgwick making the same distinction at the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention); id. at 1313 (quoting Partridgefield 
Peirce for the same); James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, 
reprinted in 9 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 844, 868 (referring 
to “direct taxation and excise”); id. at 875 (same); Letter from the Federal 
Farmer to the Republican No. XVII (Jan. 23, 1788), reprinted in 17 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 350, 357 (referring to “excises and 
direct taxes”); 22 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1942 (quoting 
Robert R. Livingston at the New York ratifying convention as distinguishing 
imposts and excises from direct taxes); id. at 1998 (quoting John Lansing, Jr., 
making the same distinction). For statements in the First Federal Congress, 
see 1 Annals of Cong. 163 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reporting James 
Madison as saying of a proposed duty on imported articles, “and will they 
submit to a direct tax, if they murmur at so light a one on salt? Will they 
submit to an excise?”); id. at 302 (reporting Madison as saying that 
alternatives to duties are excises and direct taxes); id. at 334 (reporting 
Elbridge Gerry as stating that if duties are insufficient, additional revenue 
must be obtained by a direct tax or excise); id. at 360 (reporting Alexander 
White as distinguishing between an excise and direct taxes); id. at 773 
(quoting a proposed constitutional amendment providing that a direct tax 
might be imposed only if duties, imposts, and excises prove insufficient). 
166. Supra Part II. 
167. Campbell, supra note 1, at 115. 
168. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 130. 
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The most commonly excised goods were alcoholic beverages,169 but 
there were many others.170 A 1783 Connecticut law imposed excises on 
sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages, snuff, coffee, tea, sugar, 
chocolate, and certain luxury clothes and utensils.171 Rates were higher 
for some imported goods than for those of domestic manufacture172 and 
subsequent amendment strengthened the preference for domestic art-
icles.173 The 1786 Massachusetts statute excised rum, tea, coffee, cocoa, 
sugar, raisins, tobacco, imported clocks, imported watches, coaches and 
chariots174 (on an annual basis), and other transportation devices (also 
annual).175 During the ratification debates, “Brutus” (probably Robert 
Yates of New York), assailed the Constitution in colorful language 
depicting federal excises imposed initially on alcoholic beverages but 
thence proliferating to a long list of other goods.176 
 
169. In Britain the tax on malt (used to make ale and beer) was a duty of six 
pence per bushel and a proportional sum was levied on certain liquors such 
as “cyder and perry.” 6 Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 1, at 
4408 (stating also that the malt tax was “no other than the annual excise”). 
See also 4 Chambers, supra note 1 (discussing the same subject in its entry 
on “tax”). For American examples, see 8 N.H. State Papers, supra note 
1, at 60 (Jan. 26, 1776) (recording that the New Hampshire house of 
representatives had adopted an excise on spirituous liquor) and 1801 N.Y. 
Laws 439–43 (reproducing a statute imposing a “duty of excise” on strong 
drink). The Confederation Congress was, of course, aware of state excises. 
22 J. Cont’l Cong. 177 (Apr. 10, 1782) (referring to states that had liquor 
excises). And the Confederation Congress tried to induce them to approve 
a congressional excise on alcoholic beverages. Id. at 439 (Aug. 5, 1782) 
(reproducing a report of the Confederation Office of Finance referring to 
“an excise of one eighth of dollar per gallon” on liquor). 
170. 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *310 (listing British excises); see also 
Einhorn, supra note 1, at 14 (listing British excises). 
171. 5 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 15–19 (reproducing statute). 
172. 5 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 16 (listing higher rates for imported 
than for domestic sugar and chocolate). 
173. 5 Conn. Records, supra note 1, at 116–17, 338–39. 
174. A chariot was a kind of town carriage. 1 William Felton, A Treatise 
on Carriages 26 (London 1794). 
175. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 131. For earlier statutory 
versions, see 1781 id. at 525-33 (reproducing an earlier Massachusetts 
excise that also imposed annual fees on vehicles); 1782 id. at 91 (same). 
176. Brutus VI, N.Y. J., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 15 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 110, 113-14. See also Luther Martin, Genuine Information 
VI, Balt. Md. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1788), reprinted in 15 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 374, 377 (listing possible targets for excises). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
What the Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and 
“Taxes” (Direct or Otherwise) 
328 
Most excises were laid at the point of sale,177 but some were not.178 
A New York excise was levied on tavern owners in advance of expected 
sales.179 Use of large and expensive luxury goods—such as horses180 and 
carriages—was excised on a periodic, usually annual, basis. The 1786 
Massachusetts excise statute charged owners of coaches and chariots 
£8 yearly and taxed other transportation devices annually as well.181 
A few “excises” looked much like direct taxes. For example, 
Massachusetts imposed excises on tavern owners’ inventory of alcoholic 
beverages, although as part of a formula to calculate sales.182 Even closer 
to the line was the Massachusetts excise on the total annual production 
of cider mills.183 Although the legislature probably expected all of that 
production to be consumed, the absence of any offset for surplus created 
a levy closely resembling a direct tax on production. Similarly, the 
Commonwealth’s annual “excise” on vehicles resembled a direct levy on 
personal property.184 This kinship between some excises and direct taxes 
helps explain the difficulty presented in Hylton v. United States,185 in 
which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an exaction 
on carriages for (allegedly) domestic use was direct or indirect. The 
difficulty of the case was all the greater because everyone knew, despite 
stipulations to the contrary, that some of the taxed carriages were 
actually capital assets of a rental business.186 
 
177. E.g., 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 138–39 (imposing retail 
excise payable by tavern owners). 
178. 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *310 (listing the points of collection of 
various British excises); 4 Chambers, supra note 1 (stating that an excise 
was levied “sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, or 
frequently upon the retail sale”). 
179. 1788 N.Y. Laws 283–88 (reproducing statute imposing an excise). 
180. An Enquiry into the Causes of the Present High Price of 
Provisions 51–52 (London 1767) (advocating a tax on horses because of their 
luxury character) [hereinafter An Enquiry]. See also id. at 206 (describing 
as an “indirect tax” one levied “upon horses used in coaches, &c.”). 
181. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 131. 
182. 1781 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 525–26; see also id. at 578 
(exempting carriages held for sale from excise). 
183. 1782 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 100. 
184. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 131. 
185. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
186. Id. at 171–72 (stipulating “[t]hat the Defendant, on the 5th of June, 1794, 
and therefrom to the last day of September following, owned, possessed, 
and kept, 125 chariots for the conveyance of persons, and no more: that 
the chariots were kept exclusively for the Defendant’s own private use, 
and not to let out to hire, or for the conveyance of persons for hire”). 
However, the truth of the allegation that 125 carriages were kept for one 
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One other point of vocabulary: Eighteenth century commentators 
sometimes applied variations on the word “excise” to concepts 
technically unrelated. Thus, the word “exciseman” could refer to any 
assessor, even of a direct tax. Oliver Ellsworth said that the Dutch 
“excised” even their “houses of infamy,” although the Dutch tax was 
imposed on services rather than commodities, and technically was a 
non-excise duty. 
C. The Political and Moral Bases of the Direct Tax/ 
Indirect Tax Distinction 
Direct taxes encompassed a wide range of levies, but their common 
characteristic was that they were exactions on existing and producing. 
Indirect taxes were levies on consuming, on boundary crossings, and on 
certain special transactions.187 
Some other criteria that might seem relevant to the distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes actually were not. Before the 
Revolution there had been much discussion of the difference between 
“internal” taxes (levies imposed within jurisdictional boundaries) and 
“external” taxes (levies on foreign trade).188 That was not the same as 
the difference among direct and indirect taxes, however. Although all 
direct taxes were internal, some indirect taxes—excises and other 
domestic duties—also were internal.189  
family’s private use is very unlikely. On this aspect of the case, see Jensen, 
supra note 1, at 2351–52 and Campbell, supra note 1, at 130. 
187. Supra Parts III & IV. 
188. E.g., Dickinson, supra note 1, at 37, 42–45 (discussing the distinction). 
189. The Federalist No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 302, 304 (“The taxes intended to 
be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes, may be 
subdivided into those of the direct and those of the indirect kind.”); Letter 
from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted 
in 19 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 218, 224–25 (referring to 
impost duties as external and poll and land taxes and duties on written 
instruments as internal); Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican 
No. XVII (Jan. 23, 1788), reprinted in 17 Documentary History, supra 
note 1. at 350, 358 (referring to duties, excises, and direct taxes as internal). 
Admittedly, there are Founding-Era records that may reflect some confusion 
on this point. E.g., 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 557 
(reporting speech of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention 
referring to “internal taxes or excises,” it not being clear whether Wilson 
meant to communicate that those items were mutually exclusive); Georgian, 
Gazette St. Ga., reprinted in 3 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 
236, 237 (mentioning “internal taxation and excises,” as if the two were 
separate). But there was not much uncertainty: Participants in the 
constitutional debates generally identified excises as “internal.” E.g., The 
Federalist No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 302, 304; 2 Documentary History, supra note 
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Nor did incidence of the levy define the distinction between direct 
and indirect taxes. Contemporaneous writers recognized that the 
incidence of direct taxes might fall on either the taxpayer or be passed 
on to others.190 To be sure, many asserted that the burden of indirect 
taxes usually fell on consumers,191 but commentators also acknowledged 
that in some market conditions the burden of an indirect tax could 
settle on the merchant or producer instead.192 
Nor was the line governed (as I once believed) by whether the 
exaction was imposed at the time of an item was bought or sold. Import 
and export duties were levied when an item entered or left the country 
irrespective of whether there was a change of ownership. Excises on 
high-cost luxuries (such as carriages) typically were levied annually 
rather than on sale; the annual fee might bear no relation to the sale 
price.193 New York imposed a “Duty of Excise” on tavern owners app-
arently calculated on prospective sales volume, but paid in advance.194 
The fundamental distinction between direct and indirect taxes 
seems not to have been economic, but political and moral. The political 
aspect derived from popular distaste for the levies on persons and 
production traditionally embodied in omnibus tax statutes and the 
greater popular acceptance of excises and other duties. The moral 
aspect was threefold: First, most people deemed it better for society 
 
1, at 445 (reporting speech by William Findley, an Anti-Federalist, at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
190. E.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 288–89 (claiming that a direct tax on labor 
causes the price of labor to rise accordingly, ultimately to the cost of the 
consumer). See also An Enquiry, supra note 180, at 49 (stating “[t]he 
general tendency of taxes of all kinds to enhance the price of every thing 
[sic] brought to market is too obvious to need a proof”). 
191. E.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 184–85 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed. 1834) (quoting 
John Lawrance [erroneously spelled “Lawrence”] as stating that tonnage 
on exports will raise price and is in effect a prohibited tax on exports); 
Plain Truth, Indep. Gazetter, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 216, 218 (claiming imposts will 
be included in the price); Connecticutensus, To the People of Connecticut, 
Am. Mercury, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 3 Documentary History, 
supra note 1, at 512, 514 (claiming that the consumer ultimately pays the 
cost of duties on imported goods). 
192. E.g., The Federalist No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 268; Dickinson, supra note 1, 
at 59–61 (stating that the incidence of an import duty raised the price to 
the consumer, but also acknowledging it could fall on the merchant by 
restricting his trade); see also id. at 72 (explaining that the incidence of a 
duty depends on conditions). 
193. Campbell, supra note 1, at 140. 
194. 1788 N.Y. Laws 283–88.  
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and for the development of individual character to impose burdens on 
consumption, particularly non-essential consumption, than on living or 
producing.195 Second, they deemed it morally preferable to lay burdens 
on well-to-do people who dealt in luxuries rather than on the thrifty 
and productive or on the poor and “middling folk.”196 Third, they 
thought it preferable to tax (and thereby discourage) the use of pro-
ducts, such as alcoholic beverages, that weakened individual character 
or offered marginal or negative social value.197 
The moral aspects the direct/indirect distinction are illustrated by 
legislative labeling as “excises” (and therefore indirect) annual impo-
sitions on expensive luxury items such as carriages. They are illustrated 
further by the common political technique of opposing a regulation or 
an indirect tax by assailing it as a form of immoral direct tax.198  
195. E.g., Temperate, Unborrowed Animadversions, on the Pamphlet 
lately Published by Richard Bishop of Cloyne, on the Subject of 
Tythes 17 (Dublin, J. M. Davis, No. 8, Skinner-Row 1787) (stating that 
“every Tax on honest Industry is in its Nature execrable in Society”); id. at 39 
(“A Mode of Tything which is manifestly a Tax or Check on Agriculture (that 
honest Industry which of all others is the most natural and the most conducive 
to publick Prosperity”) cannot be advisable); id. at 40 (“[B]ut a direct crippling 
Tax on such an Industry as Tillage . . . appears to us to have Something horrid 
on the Face of it.”). See also supra text accompanying note 63 (reproducing 
remarks by Oliver Ellsworth at the Connecticut ratifying convention). 
196. An Enquiry, supra note 180, at 50 (stating that “[i]t is universally 
allowed, that taxes upon luxury are of all others the most equitable, 
because the least prejudicial to the body of the people.”). 
197. E.g., supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
198. For parliamentary speeches, see 43 H.C. Jour. 167 (Feb. 4, 1788) (reporting 
petition of John Wilkinson complaining of the poor rates [property taxes] on 
his iron smelting business: “Buildings that are the necessary Instruments of 
his Trade, and which therefore, like the most ruinous of the Imposts of France, 
operate as a direct Tax upon Industry”); 27 Parliamentary Register, 
supra note 1, at 432–36 (Apr. 16, 1790) (quoting William Fullarton opposing 
the tobacco excise as functionally a “direct tax on the wages of labour”). 
Fullarton’s speech also is reported at 28 Cobbett, supra note 1, at 684. It 
addressed Richard Brinsley Sheridan’s bill against the tobacco excise. See 28 
Cobbett, supra note 1, at 649 (addressing the tobacco excise tax). 
 For newspaper articles, see Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser 
(London), Dec. 13, 1790 (assailing a proposed tax on porter [ale] as “directly 
and solely a local tax upon labour and poverty”); Gazetteer and New 
Daily Advertiser (London), Oct. 30, 1789 (printing a letter opposing the 
tobacco excise as effectively “a direct tax to the value of three days labour”); 
Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Nov. 6, 1789 (opposing 
an election regulation on the grounds that “it shall be necessary to pay a 
direct tax, not less than the local price of ten days labour”). 
 For other writings, see Second Report, Committee Appointed to 
Enquire in the State of the British Fisheries 5–7 (1785) (arguing 
that the duties on herring for home consumption operated as a “direct 
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What has been said thus far about how the founding generation 
classified impositions and taxes can be summarized in the following 
chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. The Apportionment Rule 
A. Reasons for Apportionment of Direct Taxes  
The framers’ representation, uniformity, and apportionment clauses 
were the product of compromise.199 But they were not merely the 
 
Tax upon Subsistence”); Considerations on the Policy, Commerce 
and Circumstances of the Kingdom 168 (London 1771) (arguing that 
“the payment of the bounties . . . has not only been a direct tax on the 
people to their whole amount, but also an indirect tax, in the prices of 
those commodities for their consumption, to the full of the differences 
between market and shipping rates”). 
199. Mark Antony, Indep. Chron., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 5 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 672, 673–74, 676 (describing 
the apportionment rule as a compromise). The apportionment rule 
appears at U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 3, art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
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product of compromise.200 Unifying principles can guide group decision-
making, and that was the case here. In wading through the back-and-
forth discussion on these topics at the Constitutional Convention, one 
should not let details distract from the unifying principles at work. Or, 
to resort to a stock market analogy, one should not permit seemingly-
random fluctuations to distract from underlying trends. 
In this context, the most basic unifying principle was that, at least 
in the lower legislative chamber, taxation should be coupled with 
representation.201 This principle had been a justification for the Revo-
lution and no one at the Philadelphia convention seems to have overtly 
disagreed with it. The framers saw the practical application of this 
principle as an apportionment rule that tailored each state’s tax burden 
to its congressional representation. 
In addition to the taxation/representation principle, there were at 
least two other considerations behind the decision to apportion direct 
taxes. One was that apportionment was the prevailing custom: England 
apportioned direct taxes by counties and other local entities,202 and 
 
200. Cf. Jensen, supra note 1, at 2385 (noting that “it is absurd to conclude 
that, because the apportionment rule was part of a compromise, it was a 
meaningless requirement”). 
201. 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 562 (quoting Rufus King as 
saying, “Eleven out of 13 of the States had agreed to consider Slaves in 
the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and Representation ought to 
go together.”); 6 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1241 (quoting 
Rufus King at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); Albany Federal 
Committee, An Impartial Address, Apr. 20, 1788, reprinted in 21 
Documentary History, supra note 1 at 1388, 1390 (defending the 
inclusion of slaves in the apportionment rule because “[a]greeable to the 
New System, taxation and representation must go together”). 
202. See, e.g., 13 Anne, c. 1 (1713) (apportioning, in a direct tax statute, taxes 
among counties and other local entities); 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at 
*302 (stating that the method of raising the land tax in England was “by 
charging a particular sum upon each county, according to the valuation 
given in, A.D. 1692”, and then assessing and raising that sum from 
individuals). The valuation of 1692 remained unchanged throughout the 
eighteenth century. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 16. 
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most, if not all, states similarly allocated them by towns203 or by count-
ies.204 The Articles of Confederation allocated requisitions by state land 
values.205 
Another consideration lay in values of public trust. As I have 
explained elsewhere, the Founders were heavily imbued with the idea 
that government was a public trust and should be conducted on 
fiduciary principles.206 They particularly emphasized the duty of impar-
tiality—that is, equal treatment in equal circumstances of those 
served.207 Indeed, the apportionment rule is only one of several con-
stitutional provisions designed to assure impartial treatment of both 
individuals and states.208 Without the apportionment rule, a congress-
ional majority from one group of states might vote to extract a dispro-
portionate share of revenue from the rest. The Founders had witnessed 
this political vice,209 which in modern times was captured in the late 
Senator Russell Long’s epigram, “Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that 
man behind the tree.”210 An apportionment rule would curb discrim-
inatory tax legislation. Although the interests of individuals and states 
 
203. See, e.g., 1780 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 91-104. Other apportionment 
formulae appear at 1781 id. at 503–18, 547–60; 1784 id. at 62–76; and 1785 id. 
at 580–97. A 1784 statute provided for a re-evaluation of taxable items. 1784 
id. at 57–60. 
204. E.g., Becker, supra note 1, at 67–69, 240 (New Jersey); id. at 155 (New 
York); id. at 174–76 (Delaware); Einhorn, supra note 1, at 82 (Delaware); 
id. at 92 (Pennsylvania); id. at 94 (South Carolina, by parishes, the local 
equivalent of counties). 
205. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII (“All charges of war, and 
all other expenses . . . shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which 
shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land 
within each state . . . as such land and the buildings and improvements 
thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the united states, in 
congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and appoint.”).  
206. Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Buff. L. 
Rev. 1077, 1178 (2004). 
207. See Lawson, Seidman & Natelson, supra note 1, at 441 (“[E]xecutive and 
judicial actors . . . are bound to exercise their discretionary authority with 
care, loyalty, and impartiality.”). 
208. E.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (uniformity in imposts and excises); id. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 6 (no preference given to particular states in revenue or commerce); 
id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (protecting citizens visiting other states from certain forms 
of discrimination); id. art. IV, § 3 (protecting states from unwanted divisions 
and combinations); id. art. V. (protecting state equality in the Senate). 
209. E.g., Becker, supra note 1, at 20–27 (discussing tax law manipulation in 
Rhode Island). 
210. John H. Cushman, Russell B. Long, 84, Senator Who Influenced Tax 
Laws, N.Y. Times (May 11, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/ 
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sometimes conflicted,211 as a general proposition protecting states from 
disproportionate federal tax burdens would protect individuals as well. 
Apportionment came at a cost, however. It was administratively 
clumsy, and could work injustice among similarly-situated individuals 
who happened to reside in different states. So there was an argument 
for limiting its scope. The manner in which the framers did so was to 
apply the apportionment rule to direct taxes only. For indirect taxes, 
the framers substituted a ban on federal taxation of exports212 and a 
requirement that indirect taxes213 and “Regulation of Commerce or 
Revenue” be uniform throughout the nation.214 These provisions re-
duced the chances that a congressional majority might play favorites 
among sections of the country by imposing heavier exactions in some 
places than in others. 
Why limit apportionment only to direct taxes? There were at least 
three reasons. First, the apportionment rule was problematic when 
applied to import and export customs because accidents of geography 
resulted in much higher import and export activity in some states than 
in others.215 Second, the protection offered by apportionment was more 
crucial for direct than for indirect levies. Some direct taxes, such as 
capitations and exactions on property, were “dry taxes”216—that is,  
us/russell-b-long-84-senator-who-influenced-tax-laws.html [http://perma.cc/ 
UE8H-EQFE]. 
211. Cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (resolving the conflict 
by using different representation rules in House and Senate). 
212. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. See 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 592 
(quoting Charles C. Pinckney as stating, “S. Carola. has in one year 
exported to the amount of £600,000 Sterling all which was the fruit of 
the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in proportion to this 
amount? She will not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax on 
it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the system restraining the 
Legislature from taxing Exports.”). 
213. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
214. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
215. 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 197 (reporting Rufus King as 
stating, “If the actual contributions were to be the rule the non-importing 
States, as Cont. & N. Jersey, wd. be in a bad situation indeed. It might 
so happen that they wd. have no representation.”); id. at 592 (“Mr. 
Wilson approved the principle, but could not see how it could be carried 
into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.”). But see id. (reporting 
that Gouverneur Morris supported different rules for direct and indirect 
taxes, but “[n]otwithstanding what had been said to the contrary he was 
persuaded that the imports & consumption were pretty nearly equal 
throughout the Union.”). 
216. Letter from James Sullivan to Rufus King (Sept. 28, 1787), reprinted in 4 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 21 (referring to “dry taxes, a tax 
on polls & Estates by a census”). See also Mass. Gazette, Oct. 9, 1787, 
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imposed on status rather than on transactions. It could be difficult even 
for well-to-do people to pay oppressive “dry taxes” if their wealth was 
in illiquid form. The impoverished faced even greater potential 
hardship.217 The poor could usually avoid indirect levies by avoiding 
luxuries218—in fact, some people even claimed indirect levies were 
“voluntary”219—but abstinence did not enable one to evade most direct 
taxes. Although some of the latter were adjusted according to means,220 
many were not. 
Third, limiting apportionment to direct taxes likely would restrict 
it to taxes rarely imposed. The framers expected the new federal 
government to rely, at least in times of peace, almost exclusively on 
indirect levies. This was partly because indirect levies were easier to 
collect. Duties on imports, at least, could be gathered at discrete loca-
tions, particularly seaports; but as Benjamin Franklin observed, “Direct 
taxes are not so easily levied on the scantily settled inhabitants of our 
wide extended country.”221 
 
reprinted in 4 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 61 (“No state will 
be able to pay its debts otherwise than by a dry tax”); Vox Populi, Mass. 
Gazette, Nov. 13, 1787, reprinted in 4 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 222, 224 (referring to “a dry tax on polls and estates”); Agrippa 
IX, Mass. Gazette. Dec. 28, 1787, reprinted in 5 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 540, 542 (referring to a “dry tax”). 
217. Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Cranch (Oct. 14, 1787), 
reprinted in 4 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 72, 73 (stating 
that direct taxes “tend to oppress the poor people”); 9 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 1156 (quoting George Mason at the Virginia 
ratifying convention, noting that a capitation “falls light on the rich, and 
heavy on the poor”); Hugh Williamson, Speech at Edenton, N.C., N.Y. 
Daily Advertiser, Feb. 25–27, 1788, reprinted in 16 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 201, 206 (stating that taxes on lands and heads 
“cannot fail to grind the face of the poor”). Williamson had represented 
North Carolina at the Constitutional Convention. 
218. Plain Truth: Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, Indep. 
Gazetter, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 216, 218 (arguing that “every man will have the power of refusal 
[to pay duties] by not consuming the taxed luxuries”); 2 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 481 (reporting speech of James Wilson at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
219. Philanthrop, To the People, Am. Mercury, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 3 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 467, 469 (describing the duty on 
imports as a “voluntary tax”). 
220. Supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
221. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Louis-Guillaume Le Veillard (Feb. 17, 
1788), reprinted in 16 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 135, 136. 
See also supra note 122, at 275 and accompanying text.  
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The other reason the framers expected the new government to rely 
principally on indirect taxes was that direct taxes were profoundly 
unpopular. This unpopularity prevailed in every part of the country.222 
Because some commentators seem to assume that apportionment was 
merely an accommodation to the South, it may be worthwhile to detail 
the breadth and depth of the anti-direct tax sentiment behind the 
apportionment rule. 
Direct taxes already were unpopular by 1776. That year, Mary-
land’s new Declaration of Rights proclaimed that “levying taxes by the 
poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished.”223 During 
the subsequent war the states imposed massive direct tax burdens to 
finance military actions, and after the war they continued to do so to 
finance debt repayment.224 Not just the level of taxation, but the meth-
ods of impositions were widely viewed as unfair.225 Thus, in 1786 the 
Massachusetts general court (legislature) adopted an excise statute 
reciting that its indirect levies would “ease the people as much as poss-
ible of direct taxes.”226 The following year, popular complaint induced 
Virginia to repeal its poll tax.227 
During the ratification process (1787-90) many people objected to 
granting Congress any power to lay direct taxes.228 They feared that 
 
222. Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Cranch (Oct. 14, 1787), 
reprinted in 4 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 72, 73 (stating 
that direct taxes “are always extremely unpopular”); A Dialogue Between 
Mr. Schism and Mr. Cutbrush, Bos. Gazette, Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 
4 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 162, 164 (“[D]ry Taxes are 
held in mortal detestation now a-days.”); 6 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 1245 (quoting Thomas Dawes, Jr., at the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention as saying, “[t]here is a prejudice . . . against direct taxation”). 
223. Md. Const. art. 13 (1776). During the Constitutional Convention, 
Maryland’s Luther Martin sought a rule making Congress’s power to lay 
direct taxes contingent on failure of previous requisitions. Luther Martin, 
Genuine Information VI, Balt. Md. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1788, reprinted 
in 15 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 374, 377–78. 
224. Becker, supra note 1, at 219–27. 
225. See generally Becker, supra note 1 (describing various views on the 
imposition of taxes). 
226. 1786 Mass. Resolves, supra note 1, at 130. 
227. Dodd, supra note 1, at 362. See also Va. H.D. Jour. at 12 (Nov. 4, 1777) 
(reproducing petition to repeal poll tax); id. at 190, Dec. 13, 1777 (reproducing 
recommendation of the committee of the whole for repeal of the poll tax). 
228. See, e.g., Letter from David Redick to William Irvine (Sept. 24, 1787), 
reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 135 (expressing 
reservations about the direct tax power); Freeman’s J., Sept. 26, 1787, 
reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 146–48 (objecting 
to the Constitution’s failure to ban capitations); 3 Documentary 
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Congress might raise the overall burden and undo whatever progress 
toward equity states had achieved during the war.229 At least nine state 
conventions considered motions for constitutional amendments restrict-
ing the federal direct-tax power. These motions lost in Pennsylvania230 
and Maryland,231 but they prevailed in Massachusetts,232 Rhode 
Island,233 New Hampshire,234 New York,235 Virginia,236 North Carolina,237 
and South Carolina.238 Anti-direct-tax sentiment was evident even in 
the first session (1789) of the heavily Federalist First Congress. 
Although that session ultimately failed to propose a direct-tax consti-
tutional amendment,239 its records show members straining to avoid 
direct levies.240 When North Carolina and Rhode Island joined the union 
 
History, supra note 1, at 438, 440 (reprinting statement of the Connecticut 
town of Preston objecting to the direct tax power). 
229. Becker, supra note 1, at 225–26. 
230. 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 598 (reproducing a proposed 
amendment that “no taxes, except imposts and duties upon goods imported 
and exported, and postage on letters shall be levied by the authority of 
Congress”). 
231. Amendments Proposed by William Paca in the Maryland Convention, 
Md. J., Apr. 29, 1788, reprinted in 17 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 240, 241 (“That Congress shall not lay direct Taxes on Land, 
or other Property, without a previous Requisition of the respective Quotas 
of the States, and a failing, within a Limited Time, to comply therewith”). 
See also 17 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 244–45 (discussing 
a similar amendment). 
232. 6 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1469 (demanding amendment 
that “Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the Monies arising from the 
Impost & Excise are insufficient” and requisitions first have been attempted). 
233. 26 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1000, 1001 (seventh, eighth, 
and ninth items). 
234. 18 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 186, 188 (fourth item). 
235. 18 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 297, 300–301 (statement of 
understanding); id. at 301–02, 303 (proposed amendment). 
236. 18 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 203 (third item). 
237. 18 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 317. 
238. 18 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 72. 
239. Congress did consider such an amendment. 1 Annals of Cong 76 (1789) 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reproducing proposed amendment that direct taxes 
not be imposed “but where the moneys arising from the duties, impost, and 
excise are insufficient,” and even then only after unsuccessful requisitions). 
240. E.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 281; id. at 285 (quoting John Page as 
distinguishing a duty of tonnage from direct taxes and supported a 
tonnage law to avoid direct taxes); id. at 342 (reporting Roger Sherman 
as stating that a duty is an alternative to direct taxes and arguing for 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
What the Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and 
“Taxes” (Direct or Otherwise) 
339 
after the first congressional session, both of their legislatures voted to 
instruct their Senators to oppose all direct taxes.241 
To secure the Constitution’s ratification, its promoters assured the 
public that Congress would enact direct taxes only as a last resort.242 
They contended further that congressional taxes would reduce the state 
burden on a dollar-per-dollar basis.243 They must have been grateful 
that, to bolster those unconvincing arguments, they could reassure the 
public that, if direct taxes did prove necessary, every state would bear 
only its fair share of the burden.244 Without this reassurance, the 
Constitution might not have been ratified. 
 
imposts rather than direct taxes). The sentiment against direct taxes was 
not unanimous. See id. at 314 (reporting James Jackson as stating that 
direct taxes would be more equitable than an impost). 
241. 21 Minutes of the N.C. House of Commons 1029 (Dec. 10, 1790), 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr21-0208 [http:// 
perma.cc/2CXX-Z9GZ]; 10 Records of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations in New England 409 (Providence, Providence 
Press Co., John Russell Bartlett ed., 1863–65). See also Letter from Senators 
Stanton and Foster to His Excellency the Governor of Rhode Island (Feb. 17, 
1791), in 10 Records of the State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations in New England at 422, 424 (Providence, Providence Press 
Co., John Russell Bartlett ed., 1863–65) (reproducing the response from the 
Senators, stating “those who are elected to serve in the next Congress are 
strongly opposed in principle, to levying direct taxes, or land taxes”). 
242. E.g., James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), 
reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 167, 171 (“[T]he 
objects of direct taxation should be within reach in all cases of 
emergency”); 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 558 (reporting 
speech by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 6 id. 
at 1250 (quoting Francis Dana at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 
A Native of Virginia: Observations upon the Proposed Plan of Federal 
Government, Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted in 9 Documentary History, supra 
note 1, at 655, 663 (stating that revenues from imposes and the post office 
would be sufficient). Cf. Fabius, Albany Fed. Herald, Mar. 17, 1788, 
reprinted in 20 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 862–63 (arguing 
that direct taxes are necessary in time of war). 
243. E.g., 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 481 (reporting speech of 
James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); Philanthrop, To 
the People, Am. Mercury, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 3 Documentary 
History, supra note 1, at 467, 469; 9 Documentary History, supra note 
1, at 999 (quoting George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention). 
244. 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 538 (reporting speech of 
Thomas McKean, a Federalist, at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, 
observing that a direct tax law “must equally affect every state”); Hugh 
Williamson, Speech at Edenton, N.C., N.Y. Daily Advertiser, Feb. 25–
27, 1788, reprinted in 16 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 201, 
207 (stating, “if a poll-tax, or a land-tax shall ever become necessary, the 
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B. Adoption of an Apportionment Formula  
Agreeing on the general principle of apportionment was less difficult 
than settling on a formula applying it. The Confederation system of 
allocating requisitions by state land values had proved impractical.245 
Apportionment by actual taxes paid seemed to be likewise unwork-
able.246 A new formula was needed. 
The starting point in the search was collective agreement that each 
state’s contribution in federal taxes would be a function of (1) the 
state’s population247 (2) and its wealth.248 Fortunately, experience 
strongly suggested that, for the most part, wealth followed population. 
In other words, population usually was a good proxy for wealth. 
 
weight must press equally on every part of the Union. For in all cases, 
such taxes must be according to the number of inhabitants.”). 
245. 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 542 (reporting that “Mr. Pinkney 
[said that] . . . [t]he value of land had been found on full investigation to 
be an impracticable rule”); 2 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 
462 (reporting James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention as 
saying, “[a]fter trying [the Confederation method] for a number of years, 
it was found on all hands, to be a mode that could not be carried into 
execution”); Mark Antony, Indep. Chron., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 5 
Documentary History, supra note 1, at 672–73 (confirming the same); 
6 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1245–46 (quoting Thomas 
Dawes, Jr. as affirming the same). 
246. 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 36 (“Mr. King observed that the 
quotas of contribution which would alone remain as the measure of 
representation, would not answer; because waving every other view of the 
matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the general Govt. 
that the sums respectively drawn from the States would <not> appear; and 
would besides be continually varying. <Mr. Madison admitted the propriety 
of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found.”). See also 
id. at 542 (“Mr. Pinkney [said that] . . . [t]he contributions of revenue 
including imports & exports, must be too changeable in their amount; too 
difficult to be adjusted; and too injurious to the non-commercial States. The 
number of inhabitants appeared to him the only just & practicable rule.”). 
247. Id. at 561 (quoting William Paterson) (“What is the true principle of 
Representation? It is an expedient by which an assembly of certain 
individls. [sic] chosen by the people is substituted in place of the inconvenient 
meeting of the people themselves.”); id. at 582 (“Mr. Sherman thought 
the number of people alone the best rule for measuring wealth as well as 
representation; and that if the Legislature were to be governed by wealth, 
they would be obliged to estimate it by numbers.”). 
248. E.g., id. at 567 (“Genl. Pinkney urged the reduction, dwelt on the superior 
wealth of the Southern States, and insisted on its having its due weight in the 
Government.”). See also id. at 582 (“Mr. Rutlidge [sic] contended for the 
admission of wealth in the estimate by which Representation should be 
regulated. The Western States will not be able to contribute in proportion to 
their numbers, they shd. not therefore be represented in that proportion.”). 
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Madison reported Connecticut’s William Samuel Johnson as telling the 
Constitutional Convention that “wealth and population were the true, 
equitable rule of representation; but . . . these two principles resolved 
themselves into one; population being the best measure of wealth.”249 
What was true in general, however, was not true always. Slavery 
created a valuation problem. Although few of the framers thought 
slavery was a good thing, slavery was a fact and they had to address 
the conundrum it created. The conundrum was this: 
 Slaves contributed to a state’s wealth, so if one of two similar states 
with the same free population also contained slaves, then the state 
containing slaves would produce more tax revenue, but 
 although slaves produced wealth, they did not produce as much 
wealth as an equal number of free people. This was because slaves could 
not sell their labor or talents in the free market, where incentives for 
production were strongest and labor and talents fully valued. Thus, 
given two similar and equally-populous states, one entirely free and the 
other slaveholding, the state entirely free would produce more tax 
revenue.250 
To attune state representation to projected tax contributions, 
therefore, the framers needed to calculate the tax productivity of each 
 
249. Id. at 593; see also id. at 179–80 (reporting that William Paterson, “observed 
that in districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best 
measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers 
were to form the ratio it would be the same.”); id. at 587 (“Mr. Ghorum. 
supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the rule. He said that in 
Massts. estimates had been taken in the different towns, and that persons 
had been curious enough to compare these estimates with the respective 
numbers of people; and it had been found even including Boston, that the 
most exact proportion prevailed between numbers & property.”); id. at 587–
88 (reporting James Wilson as making a comparable observation). 
250. Thus, Thomas Jefferson quoted Homer’s aphorism, written of white slaves, 
“Jove fix’d it certain, that whatever day, Makes man a slave, takes half his 
worth away.” Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984), available at http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20110221130550/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id= 
JefVirg.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed
&tag=public&part=all [http://perma.cc/KY27-A7JL]. At the Constitutional 
Convention, Pierce Butler of South Carolina argued that slaves were as 
productive as freemen, 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 580, but the 
convention disagreed. Cf. id. (reporting disagreement with Butler by Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts) and id. at 581 (reporting remarks of George Mason 
to the effect that slaves “were useful to the community at large” and so “they 
ought not to be excluded from the estimate of Representation,” but arguing 
that he “could not however regard them as equal to freemen and could not 
vote for them as such.”). 
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slave as some fraction of the tax productivity of each free person. As it 
happened, the Confederation Congress already had estimated this 
fraction as three-fifths.251 This resulted in a formula of 
T = Pf + (3/5 × Ps) 
where T was a state’s tax burden, Pf the state’s free population and Ps 
the state’s slave population. 
The three-fifths formula is sometimes said to be the product of pure 
racism,252 but the record does not support that. Madison’s summary of 
the 1783 congressional debates that produced the formula show that 
the considerations leading to it were purely economic. They included 
the respective imports and exports from states relying or not relying on 
slavery; the effect of climate differences on productivity; the levels of 
consumption of free and unfree persons; and, most importantly, the fact 
that slaves did not have the same positive incentives to produce that 
motivated free people.253 During the deliberations, moreover, the term 
 
251. 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 1, at 580 (quoting Nathaniel Gorham) 
(“This ratio was fixed by Congs. as a rule of taxation . . . .The arguments on 
ye. former occasion had convinced him that 3/5 was pretty near the just 
proportion and he should vote according to the same opinion now”). Gorham 
had served as president of Congress. National Archives, The Founding Fathers: 
Massachusetts, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_ 
founding_fathers_massachusetts.html [http://perma.cc/3YLJ-2KDA] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2015). See also Campbell, supra note 1, at 148 (quoting Calvin 
H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of 
Direct Tax, 21 Const. Comment. 295, 304–305 (2004)) (pointing out that 
the ratio had been “painfully worked out during the years 1776 to 1783 as a 
rough expression of ‘the relative price of slave and free labor’”). 
252. Richard Stengel, One Document, Under Seige, Time Mag. (June 23, 
2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2079445,00. 
html [http://perma.cc/8NF6-XLBS] (“The framers . . . gave us the idea 
that a black person was three-fifths of a human being . . . .”). 
253. 25 J. Cont’l Cong. 949 (Mar. 28, 1783) (Madison’s notes state “The 
arguments used by those who were for rating slaves high were, that the 
expence of feeding & cloathing them was as far below that incident to 
freemen as their industry & ingenuity were below those of freemen; and 
that the warm climate within wch the States having slaves lay, compared 
wth the rigorous climate & inferior fertility of the others, ought to have 
great weight in the case & that the exports of the former States were 
greater than of the latter. On the other side it was said that Slaves were 
not put to labour as young as the children of laboring families—that, 
having no interest in their labor, they did as little as possible, & omitted 
every exertion of thought requisite to facilitate & expedite it; that if the 
exports of the States having slaves exceeded those of the others, their 
imports were in proportion, slaves being employed wholly in agriculture, 
not in manufactures; & that in fact the balance of trade formerly was 
much more agst the So States than the others.”). 
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“free white inhabitants” was altered to drop the word “white,”254 
thereby including at full parity the 60,000 free African Americans then 
living in the United States.255 Also included at full parity were Indians 
who paid taxes—that is, those subject to direct state rather than tribal 
authority.256 
American slavery was the product of racism (among other causes), 
but the three fifths rule was not. Rather, it was an acknowledgment 
that people—of any race—produce more wealth, and therefore more tax 
revenue, when they operate in free markets rather than under 
conditions of command and control. 
The framers adopted the apportionment rule unanimously and the 
three-fifths formula with equal votes from the North and South.257 
VI. The Courts and Commentators (Including 
National Federation of Independent  
Business v. Sebelius) 
The conclusions arrived at in this study differ from assertions 
appearing in several Supreme Court cases and scholarly examinations, 
particularly on the scope of the phrase “direct tax.” The cases 
culminate, of course, in Chief Justice Roberts’ holding that the 
Affordable Care Act’s individual insurance penalty was a “tax,” but not 
a “direct” one.258 The scholarly examinations are referenced in the 
bibliographical footnote and throughout this Article.259 
 
254. Id. at 215 (Mar. 28, 1783). 
255. Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics On Population 
Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, 
For Large Cities And Other Urban Places In The United States, at A-1 
(U.S. Census Bureau, Population Div., Working Paper No. 76, 2005),  
https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/ 
twps0076.pdf [http://perma.cc/3HT3-9USX].  
256. Natelson, Indian Commerce, supra note 1, at 260. 
257. Campbell, supra note 1, at 114. 
258. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012). 
259. One contribution I do not discuss here is Charlotte Crane, Reclaiming the 
Meaning of ‘Direct Tax’ (Feb. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553230 [http:// 
perma.cc/64T8-8UWU]. This paper has never been published, which 
suggests that the author considers it unfinished. (An e-mail inquiring as to 
the reason for non-publication went unanswered.) In it she argues that, 
“[b]y direct taxes, the drafters [of the Constitution] had in mind the prior 
practices of the states in imposing what we would now call property taxes, 
as opposed to taxes on commercial transactions.” Id. at 3. She buttresses 
her conclusion with citations to founding-era tax statutes. Her direct 
reliance on founding-era statutes explains why her conclusion is closer to 
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In this Part, I list nine of those assertions. The first two were 
advanced shortly after the Constitution was ratified; the rest came 
later. After each, I set forth how my conclusion differs. Then I explain 
the principal reasons I believe the earlier assertions were in error. To 
be sure, the value of previous writings varies greatly, so these reasons 
apply with more force to some than to others.260 
The assertions, contrasted with my own findings, are as follows: 
Assertion #1: Direct taxes comprised only capitations and land 
levies.261 This claim seems based, in part, on the practice of referring to 
omnibus tax statutes as the “land tax,” even though they levied on 
many other objects as well. In fact, direct taxes encompassed a broad 
spectrum of impositions on personal property, income, profits, and 
enterprise.262 
Assertion #2: Apportionment of direct taxes was a surrender to the 
slave states.263 Actually, the apportionment decision had little or no-
thing to do with slavery, and the valuation formula was a purely 
economic estimate supported equally by North and South.264 
Assertion #3: The apportionment formula was designed to 
discourage slavery.265 There seems to be little evidence for this. 
 
my own than those of commentators who do not reference such sources. 
However, the primary focus of her paper is on the Hylton case. Id. at 5.  
260. For example, my conclusions on direct taxes differ only slightly with those 
in Jensen, supra note 1, which I attribute to the fact that that study also 
was characterized by careful use of a relatively wide range of sources. 
261. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796). See also Springer 
v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 599 (1880) (surveying earlier cases and 
holding that direct taxes consist only of capitations and others on land). 
262. See supra Part III. 
263. Einhorn, supra note 1 (arguing that the direct/indirect distinction and 
apportionment were preeminently the products of slavery); id. at 118–20 
(claiming the impost was adopted to avoid discussing slavery); id. at 158, 
161, 172 (claiming the apportionment rule “was intended to prevent the tax 
debates that would politicize slavery”); Jensen, supra note 1, at 2385 (citing, 
although disagreeing with, claims that the apportionment rule was designed 
to accommodate slavery). The story that apportionment was imposed merely 
to accommodate slavery may have originated with Alexander Baldwin, a 
framer who served in the First Federal Congress. 2 Annals of Cong. 1201 
(1790) (reporting Alexander Baldwin as saying that apportionment was 
imposed to prevent “any special tax upon negro slaves”). 
264. See supra Part V(B). 
265. Johnson, Fixing, supra note 1, at 296 (claiming that the purpose of appor-
tionment was to discourage slavery). 
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Assertion #4: The direct/indirect distinction was largely indeter-
minate.266 In point of fact, the distinction was widely understood among 
the founding generation.267 
Assertion #5: The distinction was a mere creation of French 
economists who got their economics wrong.268 Actually, the distinction 
owed more to Anglo-American politics and morality, with some further 
popularization by Adam Smith.269 
Assertion #6: The distinction depended on the incidence of the 
tax.270 Although some founding-era writers believed an indirect tax was 
more likely to be paid by the consumer, the fundamental distinction 
was independent of the incidence of the tax.271 
Assertion #7: A direct tax was merely a levy that could practically 
be apportioned.272 In fact, political and moral factors seem to have been 
more important to the classification.273 
 
266. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of 
Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 839, 860 
(2009); Stephanie Hunter McMahon, A Law With A Life of Its Own: The 
Development of the Federal Income Tax Statutes Through World War I, 7 
Pitt. Tax Rev. 1, 7 (2009); Einhorn, supra note 1, at 165, 183 (making 
this claim, despite having earlier surveyed state direct tax systems). See 
also Jensen, supra note 1, at 2377–78 (explaining how writers have used a 
comment by Rufus King as evidence of indeterminacy). 
267. See supra Part III. 
268. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 17–18 (ascribing the origin of the direct/indirect 
distinction to French physiocrats such as Baron Turgot). Although this origin 
is not impossible, any connection with France must have been highly 
attenuated. It seems unlikely that the authors of the popular unrest that led 
to the 1786 Massachusetts excise law or the 1787 Virginia repeal legislation 
took their terminology from Turgot. Also, the physiocrats promoted direct 
taxes—an attitude distinctly at war with views in Britain and America. 
Marquis of Condorcet, The Life of M. Turgot 145–47 (1787) 
(reporting that Baron Turgot favored direct tax to replace scores of indirect 
taxes—that is, tolls and market duties on transactions such as “sales, leases, 
transfers, and engagements”). Turgot argued that a “direct tax upon the net 
produce of land” would be the best way of assuring equity. Id. at 357.  
 The influence of Adam Smith’s direct/indirect distinction was probably 
greater than that of the physiocrats. See supra note 56. 
269. See supra Part III.C. 
270. E.g., Erik M. Jensen, Direct Taxes, in The Heritage Guide to the 
Constitution 160 (stating that the burden of indirect taxes was thought to 
be shifted to consumers while the burden of direct taxes could not be shifted). 
271. See supra Part III. 
272. See Johnson, Fixing, supra note 1. 
273. See supra Part III.C. 
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Assertion #8: Direct taxes meant the same thing as “internal” 
taxes.274 Although all direct taxes were internal, excises and many other 
duties were also internal.275 
Assertion #9: Indirect taxes were imposed on transactions and 
direct taxes were not.276 In fact, direct taxes sometimes fell on trans-
actions and indirect taxes sometimes did not.277 
Several factors led to these wrong turns. In some instances, the 
writer’s preferences have gotten in the way. For example, the justices 
deciding Hylton seem to have been hostile to apportionment,278 and 
several distinguished modern commentators clearly have been writing 
in service of pre-fixed agendas.279 In other instances, the historical 
record has been misunderstood. For example, in the eighteenth century, 
capitations were common, land was the most important capital asset, 
and direct tax statutes that actually levied on a range of items often 
were referred to as the “land tax”—hence capitations and land levies 
often were presented as examples of direct taxes.280 Presumably this 
contributed to the notion that capitations and land levies were the only 
direct taxes. 
 
274. E.g., Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 1 (arguing that a direct was 
the same as an internal tax and included excises); Jensen, supra note 1, 
at 2360 (stating that indirect taxes were those based on transfers of goods 
and services). 
275. See supra Part III.C. 
276. Jensen, supra note 1, at 2390 (“Direct taxes are those taxes that are not 
indirect, and indirect taxes are generally those consumption taxes imposed 
on transfers of goods and services.”). At one time I adhered to this view. 
277. See supra Parts III & IV. 
278. Jensen, supra note 1, at 2354 (noting that the views of the justices in 
Hylton may have been colored by their dislike of apportionment). 
279. E.g., Ackerman, supra note 1 (promoting a wealth tax and, therefore, 
arguing that only capitations should be recognized as direct); Johnson, 
Fixing, supra note 1 (promoting greater federal taxing flexibility and 
arguing that apportionment is absurd and should be avoided); see also 
Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 1. Particularly striking is the state-
ment of Robin Einhorn of her “main findings . . . [that] the antigovernment 
rhetoric that continues to saturate our political life is rooted in slavery 
rather than liberty. The American mistrust of government is not part of 
our democratic heritage. It comes from slaveholding elites . . . .” Einhorn, 
supra note 1, at 7. Einhorn comes nowhere near adequately supporting this 
thesis. Unlike some other agenda-driven authors, however, she collects much 
useful information along the way. 
280. E.g., 22 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1940 (quoting Robert 
R. Livingston at the New York ratifying convention as saying “direct 
taxes, that is, taxes on land”). 
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Anachronistic assumptions also may be at work: Today we often 
define taxes by whether they are affixed to a transaction, where their 
incidence falls, and whether they are progressive or redistributive. But 
that was not how the Founders thought. 
Most writers have based their conclusions on poor selection of 
evidence. Sometimes the selection has been both too narrow (for 
example, relying heavily on the constitutional debates while neglecting 
contemporaneous tax statutes)281 and sometimes too broad (crediting a 
great deal of nonprobative material).282 An illustration of a range too 
narrow is Justice Cardozo’s ipse dixit for the Court in Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis283 holding that the Social Security imposition on employers 
is an “excise.”284 An instance of inclusion of non-probative material has 
been the credit some writers give to events, such as the Hylton case and 
the 1798 Direct Tax Act,285 which could not have been part of the 
ratification bargain because they arose several years afterward. The 
focus on Hylton has been particularly misplaced because the contending 
arguments were, of course, generated for the litigation; because the 
justices’ dicta were unreliable, inconsistent,286 and hedged with 
qualifiers;287 and because the dicta were substantially contradicted both 
by Alexander Hamilton’s pre-case opinion (admittedly, itself suspect, 
 
281. E.g., Johnson, Fixing, supra note 1, at 7 (relying primarily on the 
Constitutional Convention); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 597 
(1880) (“The very elaborate researches of the plaintiff in error have 
furnished us with nothing from the debates of the State conventions, by 
whom the Constitution was adopted, which gives us any aid. Hence we 
may safely assume that no such material exists . . . .”). 
282. E.g., Ackerman, supra note 1, at 17–18 (relying on post-ratification material, 
including a comment by Alexander Hamilton). On Hamilton’s unreliability 
at this juncture, see Jensen, supra note 1, at 2357. Hamilton’s views seem 
to have been colored by his former position as continental collector for 
New York. Becker, supra note 1, at 162–65, 223. 
283. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
284. Id. at 583. The Court cited three examples of “duties” (not excises), one 
of which was a duty on specific transactions and two of which were 
capitations. Id. at 579–80. The Court did not examine the classification of 
general business taxes. 
285. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 1 (discussing both pre-ratification and post-
ratification events, including the Direct Tax Act and discussion of Hylton). 
286. Jensen, supra note 1, at 2354 (explaining why the dicta were unreliable 
and inconsistent). 
287. Campbell, supra note 1, at 134 (reproducing the qualifiers). 
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because Hamilton represented a party), and by Justice Iredell’s 
recently-discovered notes.288 
Evidentiary problems may have played a significant role in the Sup-
reme Court’s holding, in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (Sebelius),289 that the ACA penalty for not purchasing health 
insurance is a “tax.” Founding-era history tells us that an exaction 
designed principally for regulation rather than revenue is not a “tax” 
as the Constitution employs the term.290 In other words, to be valid 
such an exaction must be authorized by some constitutional provision 
other than the Taxation Clause. On the other hand, the ACA penalty 
certainly qualified as a regulatory exaction: Like a prohibitory tariff, it 
could serve its principal purpose only if it raised relative little 
revenue.291 The portion of the Court’s opinion discussing this issue, 
however, cited no independent evidence of original meaning.292 
A similar lack of evidence seems to have led to the Court’s finding 
that the proclaimed “tax” was not “direct.” The historical record 
informs us of the nature of the direct/indirect distinction,293 but the 
Court suggested it might be unknowable: “Even when the Direct Tax 
Clause was written,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “it was unclear what 
else, other than a capitation . . . might be a direct tax.”294 For this 
proposition, the Court referenced Springer v. United States,295 a case 
based in part on the erroneous belief that the ratification debates did 
not address the subject.296  
After a very short summary of post-founding case law, the Sebelius 
Court concluded its discussion of the tax issue in these words: 
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any 
recognized category of direct tax. It is not a capitation. Capit-
ations are taxes paid by every person, “without regard to prop-
erty, profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton, supra, at 175 
(opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis altered). The whole point of the 
shared responsibility payment is that it is triggered by specific 
 
288. Campbell, supra note 1, at 112–13 (mentioning the discovery of the notes 
in 2003 and quoting from them). 
289. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
290. See supra Part II. 
291. See supra Part II. 
292. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598. 
293. See supra Part IV. 
294. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598. 
295. 102 U.S. 586 (1881). 
296. Id. at 596–98. 
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circumstances—earning a certain amount of income but not 
obtaining health insurance. The payment is also plainly not a tax 
on the ownership of land or personal property. The shared 
responsibility payment is thus not a direct tax that must be 
apportioned among the several States.297 
In citing Justice Chase’s dictum on capitations, the Sebelius Court 
failed to acknowledge that Chase had advanced his definition only 
tentatively: “I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial 
opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are 
only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax . . . .and a tax on LAND.”298 
Beyond that, the citation is further evidence of lack of evidence. The 
historical record, after all, tells us that Chase’s supposition was 
unquestionably false: In the real world, capitations frequently were 
adjusted or waived for all sorts of circumstances.299 
Particularly striking about the Sebelius opinion is that the Court 
never addressed the question of whether the penalty might be an 
indirect tax. This is peculiar, since the Supreme Court had stated 
previously that direct and indirect taxes are mutually-exclusive 
categories,300 so a natural part of the process of determining that the 
penalty was not direct should have been determining whether it was 
indirect. Examination of the founding-era record would have informed 
the Court that a penalty for “going without health insurance does not 
fall within any recognized category”301 of indirect tax. The penalty was 
not tonnage, for it was not imposed on the cargoes of ships. It was not 
an excise, for it was imposed on the non-consumption of services rather 
than on the consumption of commodities. It was not an impost, for it 
was not a tax on imports. Nor was it any other kind of duty, for it was 
not levied on a transaction or event. 
On the contrary, the penalty, assuming it was a tax at all, was a 
classic direct or “dry” tax. That is, it was imposed on citizens not for 
anything they had consumed or done, but for merely living and 
(arguably) for producing. Since it was imposed by the head (or “poll”) 
and not on property or “faculties,” it is most plausibly categorized as a 
capitation. The fact that it was adjusted for income and other circum-
stances did not disqualify it as such. Such gradation simply rendered it 
akin to the many other founding-era capitations scaled by ability to 
pay and by other circumstances.302 
 
297. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2599. 
298. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (emphasis added). 
299. See supra Part III. 
300. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895). 
301. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599. 
302. Supra notes 111–116 and accompanying text; Campbell, supra note 1, at 171. 
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So if the penalty truly was a tax, Congress should have apportioned 
it. 
 Conclusion 
The original legal force of the Constitution is how courts and 
lawyers would have applied the document immediately after its ratif-
ication. In the language of the time, any financial exaction was called 
an imposition. An imposition could be imposed principally to raise 
revenue or principally for regulatory purposes. A tax was an imposition 
principally to raise revenue. Taxes were authorized by Article I, Section 
8, Clause 1—the Taxation Clause. Regulatory impositions had to be 
grounded in some other congressional power, such as the Commerce 
Clause. A regulatory imposition outside Congress’s enumerated powers 
was not constitutional. 
According to the Constitution’s original legal force, a tax was direct 
if laid on one’s status or on one’s living or livelihood—i.e., on product-
ion. Direct taxes encompassed capitations, taxes on property and weal-
th, taxes on businesses and trades, and taxes on personal and business 
income and profit of all kinds. Indirect taxes were impositions for 
revenue levied on the consumption of goods and services and on certain 
specific transactions, such as importing and exporting and creating legal 
documents. The distinction between direct and indirect levies was 
primarily political and moral rather than economic. 
A duty was any imposition (whether regulatory or for revenue) that 
was not a direct tax. Duties included, but were not limited to, excises, 
imposts, and tonnage. Excises were duties on the consumption of 
commodities, usually manufactured goods. Excises often were levied at 
the point of sale, but if tied to consumption, they might be payable at 
other times. Imposts were duties on imports, whether or not import was 
accompanied by a sale or ownership transfer. Tonnage was a duty on 
ships entering or leaving harbors, assessed by cargo capacity. Duties 
that were not excises, imposts, or tonnage included fees for specific 
transactions, such as those on exports and the execution of legal 
documents or the delivery of specific services. 
The framers decided to adopt the apportionment rule for at least 
three reasons, none of them related to slavery. They were (1) to ensure 
that taxation was linked with representation, (2) to comply with cust-
om, and (3) to comply with the public trust standard of impartiality 
by preventing unfair treatment of politically weak states. 
The administrative complexity of the apportionment rule made it 
desirable to limit its scope. The line of limitation selected was the 
boundary between direct and indirect taxes. Apportionment was 
restricted to direct taxes partly because of the difficulty of apportioning 
indirect levies and partly because the collection difficulties and 
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universal unpopularity of direct taxes suggested that the federal govern-
ment was less likely to impose them. 
The three-fifths apportionment formula was designed to approx-
imate taxation and representation. Population figures were sufficient 
for most purposes, but slavery presented a special problem because 
slaves increased a state’s tax production, but less so than an equal 
number of free citizens. The three-fifths formula was an economic calc-
ulation previously arrived at by the Confederation Congress. It was not 
an independent statement of racism, nor was it designed to promote or 
discourage slavery. 
Previous treatments of the terms examined in this Article have 
suffered from a number of methodological problems, leading to some 
inaccurate conclusions. The best known recent example is the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Sebelius that a penalty adopted for regulatory 
purposes was a “tax” but not a direct one. According to the Consti-
tution’s original meaning, the penalty was not a tax. If categorized as 
a tax, however, it was direct—most plausibly a capitation—and should 
have been apportioned. 
